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This piece begins with an election. Not the election 
you’re probably thinking of, but one which took 
place sufficiently long ago for its initial notorie-
ty to have faded with time. We need to go all the 
way back to 2001, when the then Australian prime 
minister, John Howard, unexpectedly won re-elec-
tion on the back of a campaign primarily based on 
the demonisation of asylum seekers. Howard infa-
mously  declared  that “we will decide who comes 
to this country and the circumstances in which 
they come.” He also used military force to prevent 
a Norwegian vessel that had saved the lives of 438 
asylum seekers from entering Australian waters. 
These asylum seekers were predominantly from 
Afghanistan. They were fleeing a repressive Taliban 
regime against which Australia was soon to fight a 
war at the side of the United States, yet relatively few 
Australians were sympathetic to their plight. Two 
months later, sensational claims that asylum seekers 
on another sinking vessel had thrown their children 
overboard were front page news. They were later re-
vealed to be false.
Howard’s xenophobic tactics continue to define 
Australian politics to this day. In 2001, he intro-
duced policies which saw asylum seekers attempt-
ing to reach Australia by boat detained in  huge-
ly expensive  and  extremely abusive offshore 
detention centres. These have been consistently de-
scribed as “a living hell”, “a human rights catastro-
phe”, and “unlawful”, yet they still command broad 
support within Australia. Efforts were made to roll 
back Howard’s ‘Pacific solution’ when a centre-left 
government led by Kevin Rudd finally took power 
in 2007, but relentless right-wing attacks accusing 
his party of being ‘soft’ on migration proved to be 
a huge liability. Offshore detention would be re-es-
tablished under a left-wing government, and the 
vast majority of Australian politicians have now 
spent most of the twenty-first century seeing who 
can yell  ‘stop the boats’  the loudest. Howard’s ap-
proach to immigration continues to be cited as a 
model which is worthy of emulation by right-wing 
voices in many countries.
Many governments throughout the globe have poor 
track records when it comes to migration. They 
have little sympathy for people seeking refuge, no 
matter the circumstances from which they are try-
ing to escape, and they pride themselves on their 
‘toughness’ when it comes to turning away requests 
for help. At the same time, however, governments 
such as Australia’s have also proclaimed their sym-
pathy and support for another vulnerable group: 
victims of human trafficking and ‘modern slavery’. 
In 2018, the Australian government introduced 
new anti-slavery legislation, declaring its intention 
to “harness the power of big business to help com-
bat modern slavery” while also continuing to work 
with “our tireless civil society partners”. This legisla-
tion has been widely celebrated. The national man-
ager of the Salvation Army’s Freedom Partnership 
to End Modern Slavery even declared that “it’s not 
quite Wilberforce ending slavery but it’s up there”.
Numerous governments have congratulated them-
selves and their peers for passing similar legisla-
tion in recent times. The Canadian government is 
currently considering its own Modern Slavery Act, 
which is closely modelled upon the Australian and 
British versions, and a similarly warm reception 
can be expected. In stark contrast to the issue of mi-
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grant rights, these official efforts against trafficking 
and slavery draw support from across the political 
and ideological spectrum and have been endorsed 
by both corporate and civil society voices. While 
the Australian government has signed the Palermo 
trafficking protocol, it was one of a number of states 
which strongly objected to the Global Compact on 
Migration, despite its non-binding character.
The tactical appeal of human trafficking and 
modern slavery
The very different political profiles of the two main 
issues considered above help to bring a series of 
strategic and tactical considerations into focus. 
Over the last three decades, governments, corpo-
rations, and many other institutions have publicly 
championed efforts to combat trafficking and mod-
ern slavery. These efforts are said to be motivated by 
humanitarian concerns for the most vulnerable and 
exploited, yet this concern rarely extends to other 
forms of vulnerability.
As we have already seen, it is really not a good time 
to be a migrant. Border walls have been built in 
huge numbers (from 15 in 1989 to 77 in 2018). Xen-
ophobia has flourished. Budgets to prevent mi-
gration are  measured in billions. Moreover, this 
widespread hostility towards migrants frequently 
intersects with another major global trend: the ero-
sion of rights and protections for precarious work-
ers thanks to outsourcing, subcontracting, and de-
regulation. In recent decades, campaigners focusing 
upon migrant and worker rights have lost countless 
political battles. And, on the rare occasions when 
they manage to hold or take ground, their efforts 
are subject to entrenched opposition.
The appeal of anti-trafficking and modern slavery 
campaigns needs to be understood within this larg-
er context. The political obstacles associated with 
migration and work have led at least some cam-
paigners to try to identify more promising plat-
forms of mobilisation, and in the course of their 
search they have gravitated towards trafficking and 
slavery, which have a quite different political profile. 
Since modern slavery campaigns command an un-
usual level of bipartisan support, they can open up 
avenues that are not readily available when it comes 
to worker and migrant rights. They may not be an 
effective platform for advocating for radical social 
and economic change, but they may provide a use-
ful fall-back position if you have made a tactical de-
cision that limited gains are better than none.
Modern abolitionist campaigns also enjoy other po-
litical advantages. Migrants and workers frequently 
have complex (and contestable) life stories and do 
not necessarily regard themselves as victims. This 
is much less of a challenge in the case of modern 
slavery, which tends to be strongly associated with 
simplistic narratives of ‘innocence lost’ and ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’, which have proved to be a powerful mech-
anism for  attracting interest and investment. Few 
corporations are interested in supporting workers’ 
rights, since they associate improvements in this 
area with higher labour costs, yet they frequent-
ly  endorse  anti-trafficking and slavery campaigns, 
which are regarded as politically ‘safe’. Similarly, 
governments who are criticised for their human 
rights abuses also find modern slavery campaigns 
appealing, since they cast them in the role of sav-
iour and protector of the most vulnerable.
When all of these considerations are put togeth-
er they point to a crucial yet rarely acknowledged 
cost-benefit calculation: many different constituen-
cies have made a tactical decision that campaigns 
focusing upon trafficking and slavery are more 
attractive than other potential alternatives. Doors 
are opened which might otherwise have remained 
closed. New sources of access, influence, and re-
sources can be developed. Governments and cor-
porations who might otherwise have been indif-
ferent or opposed to other kinds of causes are also 
inclined to sign on in support, since it also serves 
their own agendas.
Are we better off on the inside?
These kinds of tactical calculations do not feature 
prominently in public conversations regarding 
trafficking and slavery. This is partly because they 
tend to be portrayed as exceptional problems which 
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stand apart from – or above – most other politi-
cal causes, and partly because talking too openly 
about your political strategy also runs the risk of 
undercutting your strategy. Calculations regarding 
potential trade-offs and benefits mostly take place 
behind the scenes. There are times, however, when 
this public façade is breached. Activists and insid-
ers who work on modern slavery and trafficking are 
generally reluctant to speak too openly, but there is 
one common refrain that comes up time and time 
again in private meetings and off the record conver-
sations: we are better off on the inside.
This is an old refrain. Political campaigners have 
grappled for centuries with the question of wheth-
er it is better to try and reform things from with-
in than to challenge them from without. There are 
two key versions of this recurring dilemma when 
it comes to trafficking and slavery. The first is con-
cerned with the relationship between these and 
other causes, such as migrant and worker rights. In 
this context, being ‘on the inside’ means using traf-
ficking and slavery as a primary basis for activism 
and advocacy, since it is believed to help facilitate 
greater levels of attention, influence, and resources. 
The second is concerned with the relationship be-
tween modern abolitionist campaigners and polit-
ical and economic elites. In this context, being ‘on 
the inside’ means trying to establish alliances with 
governments and corporations in order to nudge 
them in more favourable directions.
There are costs and benefits to life on the inside. 
Let’s start with the latter. Campaigners working on 
modern slavery and trafficking frequently enjoy 
levels of public endorsement, access, and private 
and public funding that campaigners working on 
more politically challenging causes can only envy. 
This is especially true of campaigners in the Global 
North, who comprise the vast majority of this field. 
It has become clear, moreover, that modern slavery 
and trafficking are now ‘where the action is’. Since 
the mid 1990s, a tremendous amount of interest 
and activity has been focused upon modern slavery 
and trafficking, and this level of interest has only 
further increased with time.
One key measure of this activity is the passage of 
new laws. In 2018, the  United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime  reported that 168 states “have 
legislation in place that criminalizes trafficking 
in persons”, marking a remarkable jump  from 33 
states in 2003. This means that 135 countries – or 
around 73% of all states in the UNODC database – 
passed new legislation within a fifteen-year period. 
This constitutes one of the most intense periods of 
legislative activity in the history of human rights.
A raft of other activities have accompanied these 
new laws. Criminal justice reforms have been a 
global focal point. Specialised taskforces, bureau-
cratic processes, training programmes, and victim 
protection measures have all sprung into existence. 
New regional and bilateral agreements have been 
signed. Global alliances have been established. Ce-
lebrities have been mobilised. Numerous movies 
and documentaries have been released. Countless 
marches have taken place. All of these efforts have 
generated a tremendous amount of attention and 
investment, and insiders and campaigners have 
“Political and economic elites tend to favour self-serving and lowest 
common denominator approaches which don’t rock the boat.”
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been kept very busy trying to harness all the energy 
that trafficking and slavery have unleashed. Many 
campaigners and organisations working on related 
issues have also seen the writing on the wall, and 
have therefore strategically taken up the trafficking 
and slavery cause as well.
Most insiders are confident that all of these initi-
atives are having a cumulative and positive effect. 
Police and prosecutors can point to the criminals 
they have prosecuted and the victims they have res-
cued. Service providers can point to the additional 
resources they have to provide support. Lawyers 
can point to legislation that provides at least some 
provisions for victim protection. Bureaucrats can 
point to new protocols and procedures that better 
equip them to take action. Corporations can point 
to their public commitments and internal policies 
and procedures. Diplomats can point to the reforms 
which they attribute to public shaming and quiet 
negotiations. Campaigners can point to increased 
public interest and awareness. Insiders accept that 
there may be problems with some campaigns or 
interventions, but contend that these are overshad-
owed by all the good things which are taking place.
Many insiders also see the energy lighting up their 
activism as a political resource that can potentially 
be deployed – or stretched – in order to advance 
larger political causes and alter political conversa-
tions. Taken to its logical conclusion, this approach 
suggests that there may not be any need for trade-
offs, since concerns about modern slavery can 
also be harnessed in order to draw attention to the 
plight of other precarious and vulnerable popula-
tions. When modern slavery campaigns focus upon 
extreme abuses on shrimp boats in South East Asia, 
then doesn’t this also create a platform for challeng-
ing poor working conditions more generally? This 
overall approach is sometimes described in terms 
of stepping stones, where targeting extreme abuse 
is portrayed as the first step in a longer term and 
more ambitious political project. The first steps may 
well be modest, but surely more ambitious second 
and third steps can be anticipated in the future?
Are we really better off on the inside?
The case for life on the inside builds upon the 
claim that modern slavery and trafficking provide 
an unusually effective platform for securing real 
world gains. It is important to recognise, however, 
that the calculus is considerably more complicat-
ed than simply declaring that something is better 
than nothing. There are three main considerations 
that need to be highlighted here: 1) it is not clear 
that all of the energy expended has been especially 
effective in practical terms; 2) campaigns against 
modern slavery and trafficking can be deeply com-
promised by other political agendas; and 3) there 
are times when interventions targeting trafficking 
and slavery cause more harm than good.
The first question regarding efficacy is hard to eval-
uate. Changing the world has never been easy, so it 
is reasonable to anticipate that many mobilisations 
will struggle to have a practical effect. Campaigns 
of all stripes find it difficult to get off the ground. 
This is clearly not the case on this occasion, so it’s 
important to ask how much of the energy expend-
ed has actually translated into practical gains. As 
we have seen, campaigns against modern slavery 
and human trafficking have been able to secure an 
unusual level of support from many governments 
and corporations. However, this support frequently 
comes at a practical price, since political and eco-
nomic elites tend to favour self-serving and lowest 
common denominator approaches which don’t 
rock the boat. This results in a paradoxical situation 
where many high-profile solutions to the problems 
associated with trafficking and slavery end up be-
ing both politically appealing and practically inef-
fective for the same reason: they rarely challenge 
dominant political and economic interests.
One illustration of this larger dynamic involves 
campaigns which seek to ‘raise awareness’ of traf-
ficking and slavery. These are extremely popular 
in both policy and activist circles, but it is far from 
clear whether they have much if any positive effect. 
They may even cause harm by promoting racial and 
gender profiling or by triggering false positives, 
where people are wrongly treated as suspected traf-
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ficking cases because they somehow ‘fit the signs’. 
Similar concerns also apply to popular training 
programmes for taxi drivers, hotel and airline staff, 
and immigration agents.
The recent proliferation of ‘apps’ focusing upon 
trafficking does not really help much either. Over 
the last two decades numerous claims have been 
made about the power of technology as a weapon 
in the fight against modern slavery, but many of the 
claims which have been made about technology are 
based upon future potential. Technological ‘solu-
tions’ risk being the train that never actually arrives 
at the station, and instead primarily operate in the 
realm of technocratic fantasy.
The lots-of-smoke-but-no-fire critique can be equal-
ly levied at  corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
schemes. These are supposed to encourage voluntary 
action to combat trafficking and slavery in global 
supply chains, but their main value from a corporate 
standpoint is their capacity to help deflect calls for 
binding public regulation. The central idea behind 
CSR is that enlightened corporations can play a key 
role in reducing modern slavery. While this sounds 
good in theory, the discretionary nature of the entire 
exercise means that corporations consistently avoid 
taking actions which go against their own interests, 
and many of them have a direct interest in depressing 
wages, conditions, and margins in ways which direct-
ly enable various forms of exploitation and abuse.
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Further complications arise when it comes to crim-
inal justice reforms. Investing in criminal justice 
will always be the politically ‘safe’ option, since 
efforts to more effectively prosecute criminals is a 
cause which commands high levels of support. The 
main drawback with this approach is that it con-
sumes a large amounts of institutional bandwidth, 
and therefore leaves relatively limited scope for al-
ternatives. When criminal justice models prove to 
be ineffective and disappointing, which has been 
the dominant pattern to date, the somewhat par-
adoxical response has been to invest even further 
in criminal justice models in the hope of getting 
things right the next time. The fundamental prob-
lem here is that criminal justice responses focus on 
symptoms, rather than underlying causes. Modern 
slavery and trafficking are issues which are unlikely 
to be effectively resolved via prosecutions.
Many of these high-profile ‘solutions’ are also 
marked by a reluctance to engage too deeply or 
directly with questions of economic and political 
interest. It is instead assumed that nearly everyone 
must be on the same side, since all people of good 
will are united in their opposition to extreme abuse. 
This contributes in a widespread tendency to treat 
trafficking as a technical challenge, and thereby fail 
to sufficiently engage with the fraught relationship 
between policies, interests, and larger agendas.
It has proved very easy to justify any number of pol-
icies in anti-trafficking or anti-slavery terms. Re-
cent efforts to heavily restrict mobility by building 
a literal wall in the US or a metaphorical fortress 
in Europe are not motivated by concerns about 
the plight of migrants. Yet they have nonetheless 
been justified in humanitarian terms to prevent the 
criminal schemes of human traffickers. As Melissa 
Gira Grant has demonstrated, Donald Trump has 
invoked trafficking to give “… his ‘big, beautiful 
wall’ a humanitarian gloss, while stirring up racist 
panic about immigrants from Mexico and Central 
America, who, Trump says, use ‘blue tape’ to gag 
women and girls, ‘tying up their hands behind their 
back and even their legs’—a disturbing, baseless de-
tail Trump mentions frequently”.
Corporations have also found that narrowly fo-
cusing upon individual cases of ‘exceptional’ abuse 
is an effective strategy for displacing or deflecting 
concerns about how they treat their workers more 
generally. When Ivanka Trump denounces modern 
slavery as an “ugly stain on civilization”, she is not 
thinking of the Trump-branded products made by 
precarious and vulnerable workers in places such 
as Indonesia. Campaigns focusing upon modern 
slavery often leave larger systems at the margins of 
the frame. They may not only be ineffective. They 
may also end up indirectly legitimating the global 
economic systems which manufacture systems of 
vulnerability and abuse in the first place.
Some of the negative effects of anti-slavery and 
anti-trafficking interventions have come to be de-
scribed in terms of “collateral damage”. These dam-
ages include police abusing people they are supposed 
to be rescuing and immigration agents deporting 
migrants captured in raids. They are particularly 
acute in the case of commercial sex work, where all 
kinds of harmful external interventions, such as bans 
on advertising sex work online, have been chiefly 
justified in terms of combating sex trafficking. Fur-
ther problems have also been identified in relation to 
‘raid and rescue’ operations, which involve kicking 
down doors to arrest villains and rescue victims.
While rescue and rehabilitation sound good they 
frequently fall short in practice. People who have 
been ‘rescued’ can be subject to deportation pro-
ceedings or forcibly incarcerated in poorly run and 
unsafe ‘care homes’. These homes are notorious in 
India, where sex workers who have been ‘rescued’ 
routinely end up running from their ‘rescuers’. For 
many sex workers, campaigns against trafficking 
and slavery can be best understood as a stalking 
horse for a longstanding political agenda which 
seeks to deny the legitimacy of sex work as work. 
Not everyone who works in this field has the same 
attitude towards sex work, but the frequently neg-
ative effects of these campaigns and interventions 
for sex workers raises challenging questions about 
the costs and benefits of life on the inside, since it is 
other insiders who are targeting sex work.
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Inside? Outside? Do we really need to choose?
Once all of these considerations are placed on the 
table the cost/benefit calculus becomes very chal-
lenging. Insiders can point to positive gains, yet 
questions remain about the extent to which their 
activities end up helping to both legitimate and 
disguise other political and economic agendas. 
Outsiders may be less compromised, yet they may 
also find it difficult to advance their goals, since 
campaigns focusing upon migrant and worker 
rights have been on the back foot for decades now. 
Campaigns against human trafficking and modern 
slavery may well be flawed from an analytical and 
political standpoint, but they also command a high 
degree of political currency and legitimacy. What 
would we stand to gain or lose in political and stra-
tegic terms if we started somewhere else? Perhaps 
attempting to discard trafficking and slavery is also 
politically risky? Does being ‘on the outside’ mean 
sacrificing at least some access and influence in fa-
vour of a more ambitious and ideologically ‘pure’ 
political vision, which ultimately has very little 
chance of actually being realised in practice?
These are not the kind of questions which can be 
answered once and for all, but instead require close 
and continual attention to potential trade-offs, op-
portunities, and complications. Not all anti-slavery 
or trafficking interventions look the same, and the 
kinds of strategic calculations which shape the be-
haviour of civil society campaigners may well be 
different to the calculations of officials working for 
governments or international organisations. Things 
may look different for lawyers than for social work-
ers. Political constraints and opportunities found 
in one country are going to be different to those 
in other countries. There may be occasions when 
anti-trafficking or anti-slavery are strategically 
beneficial. There may be others where they are not. 
Context matters a great deal here.
That being said, it is not possible to entirely dis-
entangle the local from the global. Campaigns 
against modern slavery and trafficking consume a 
huge amount of energy and attention, and therefore 
have the effect of both displacing and distorting 
other kinds of political conversations. Being on ‘the 
inside’ may offer short-term gains which come at a 
longer-term cost. Many campaigners in many dif-
ferent fields have recognised that the levels of inter-
est and investment associated with trafficking and 
slavery can be harnessed to help advance their own 
goals, but this in turn contributes to a widespread 
reluctance to bite the hand which feeds. Many in-
siders are aware that there are major problems with 
modern slavery and human trafficking in both the-
ory and practice, yet they nonetheless remain re-
luctant to say too much about many of these prob-
lems in public, since this runs the risk undercutting 
their political platform. Major scandals frequently 
disappear without leaving a trace, such as the dis-
astrous ‘slave redemption’ programme in Sudan or 
the  fabrications of Somaly Mam. Shortcomings 
continue to be excused since the field is ‘new’, de-
spite having been around for decades. If there con-
tinues to be little or no appetite for internal critique 
and public reflexivity then the same kinds of ‘solu-
tions’ will be tried again and again, despite their 
now well-documented flaws and limitations.
This collection features a range of positions and 
perspectives regarding the tactical and strategic 
calculations associated with human trafficking 
and modern slavery. All of our contributors accept 
that there is room for further improvement when 
it comes to current practices. The key issue here 
is not whether or not things can be improved, but 
instead what improvement might look like. Some 
people want to build upon what we have by devel-
oping new strategies and models. Others want to 
tear things down and start somewhere else. Some 
favour a mix of both approaches. While everyone 
has a view regarding what should be done, the rub-
ber really hits the road when it comes to identifying 
the strategies which are required in order to trans-
late these goals into practice.
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Neil Howard (BTS): What does your instinct tell 
you about whether or not we’re better off on the in-
side of the project to end ‘modern slavery’?
Joanna Ewart-James (Freedom United):  The lan-
guage you use and how you try to tackle the issue 
within that framing is, I argue, more important than 
whether you are trying to effect change from within 
an institution or not. I differentiate between actors 
who see modern slavery as an aberration to normal 
society, and the position I hold that it is actually for 
a large part a systemic problem. That it’s a result of a 
system where labour protections are weak, discrim-
ination thrives, and where priority is often given to 
other matters like immigration policies, cheap pric-
es, and fractured supply chains. In my view these 
causes make exploitation almost inevitable.
I’ve always talked about modern slavery. As much 
as it’s simply an umbrella term that doesn’t have a 
specific conceptual meaning, that puts me on the 
inside of the ‘modern slavery framing’. But inside 
that inside, I’m not part of the camp that says this is 
an aberration or crime that isn’t accepted. I say, ‘No, 
it is accepted. Of course it’s accepted. That’s why it 
happens so much, because we do tolerate it.’ That’s 
where my position is different.
I see the language of modern slavery as helpful be-
cause this is pretty shocking – the way that people 
are exploited really is serious. There are of course 
many forms of exploitation. It’s a continuum, and 
some forms are less severe than others. At the ex-
treme end it’s particularly dark, and I think it should 
be recognised for that.
It’s important to realise that the things that need to 
change to address the most extreme forms would 
also address other forms of exploitation – those that 
don’t meet the criteria of what’s widely understood to 
be captured by the broad concept of modern slavery, 
like forced labour and bonded labour. They’re going 
to help. For example, there have been some really in-
teresting developments lately around the 1930 Tariff 
Act in the United States. Under section 307 of this act 
US Customs and Border Protection should prohibit 
the import of goods produced through forced labour. 
It has increased its enforcement efforts in recent 
months. This ‘inside’ mechanism has the potential to 
turn expectations of what is acceptable – no forced 
labour – into a shift of better working conditions for 
those producing those goods.
Now, the Tariff Act is obviously a political mech-
anism. That’s the way it was first established, and 
perhaps the way it’s still used. But I do wonder 
how much the US government actually recognises 
its potential for changing a system in which forced 
labour is endemic. Does it realise just how many 
goods would have to be withheld at customs if it 
was going to properly enforce that provision? It re-
ally would be a lot.
Neil: So the strategic takeaways are that a) the term 
modern slavery can be used to mobilise people be-
cause of its extreme connotations; and b) the meas-
ures for tackling these extreme forms of abuse are 
likely to have positive knock-on effects for everyday 
exploitation – forms of abuse that aren’t quite as se-
rious as what is called modern slavery but that are 
caused by the same systemic issues. Is that right?
INTERVIEW
Why does Freedom United use the term ‘modern 
slavery’?
Joanna Ewart-James with Neil Howard
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Joanna: Yeah, that›s right. I’d like to add that while 
not all forms of exploitation are extreme, a signifi-
cant portion of systemic exploitation actually does 
fit the bill. More recent pieces of legislation, like the 
International Labor Organization’s Forced Labor 
Protocol, pick up on that. Now, this is a tool from 
‘the inside’ – it’s part of the core standards providing 
fundamental rights – but the language in it clearly 
points to a problem in the current system. Arti-
cle 2 (d) makes clear the need to protect migrant 
workers from abusive and fraudulent practices dur-
ing recruitment. It may not use the term modern 
slavery but in talking about the role of recruiters, it 
points to changes needed in the ‘main system’.
I completely concede that there is a real lack of at-
tention in the inside world regarding the system-
ic nature of forced labour. A lot of topics we pick 
up at Freedom United aren’t seen as systemic or as 
trafficking issues by others in this space. A key one 
would be forced prison labour in the US. We have 
been actively campaigning on this, targeting the 
corporations contracted to detain people, seeking 
divestment, and even pushing for modification of 
the constitution, which currently allows slavery as a 
punishment for crime under the thirteenth amend-
ment. And I think that making it clear that these 
examples are actually modern slavery, for want of 
a better word, wakes people up to the degree of ex-
ploitation, how linked into the system it is, and the 
seriousness of the problem that we’re facing.
Neil: So you’re saying that the terminology of mod-
ern slavery has such gravity that there’s almost a po-
litical shock value attached to using it. The standard 
comeback to that position, made by critical academ-
ics as well as others, is that by defining modern slav-
ery as the worst of the worst and then focusing in on 
that, you implicitly normalise less severe, everyday 
forms of exploitation. How do you respond to that?
Joanna:  I’d begin by reiterating that ending the 
most extreme forms will inevitably tackle the more 
everyday forms. There are lots of different exam-
ples around domestic abuse or women’s rights, for 
example, where successfully tackling the most ex-
treme form has had knock-on effects on the more 
everyday forms.
Starting with the most extreme forms is also a way of 
building recognition. Society at large doesn’t yet accept 
that these conditions are unacceptable. In other words 
society right now tolerates the extreme exploitation 
of other people. And at worst, that looks like modern 
slavery. Given that status quo, how do you bring about 
the shift in social values that you would need to ad-
dress everyday forms of exploitation if you don’t even 
challenge the most extreme forms of exploitation that 
constitute modern slavery?
So we have a job to do. We need to open eyes to what 
this exploitation is that we’re talking about, and get 
society to say, ‘Actually no. That’s not on. I’m calling 
that out.’ I think it’s too easy to dismiss if you just talk 
about everyday exploitation. People will say, ‘Oh, 
well, they’re migrants. They just want to work all the 
time and it’s better for them here than it is at home. 
At least they’ve got a job.’ That’s the narrative that we 
hear all too often from the naysayers. It’s a really hard 
problem – how do we galvanise society and shift so-
ciety’s values so that we are more intolerant of the 
whole range of exploitation?
I don’t think it should be about using shock and 
horror for the sake of it. It’s about tuning into what 
we have already agreed is not acceptable. If you go 
out and do a poll, you’ll find that people agree that 
slavery is not acceptable. There’s not a debate about 
that. So by using that language, we’re already a step 
ahead in ending this egregious exploitation. Now, 
the problem that we’ve had, especially in the UK 
prior to 2014, has been to get people to acknowl-
edge that it’s relevant to us today. People have said, 
‘Yes, slavery is not acceptable,’ but they’ve also said 
‘it’s history’. There was no connection between this 
value of slavery being not acceptable and the con-
ditions under which people are exploited today. But 
we’re starting to see a change.
So I’m not saying that we should use the term 
modern slavery because it has shock value or be-
cause being sensationalist helps us. I am very much 
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against sensationalising anything in this topic, as in 
fact I find it very unhelpful. That’s not the reason-
ing. My reasoning is to get people to recognise that 
what they’re seeing doesn’t align with their values. 
That’s a job to do. And I just think we’ve already 
partway there when we use the term modern slav-
ery, because people know that’s not acceptable – 
they just don’t see what’s happening.
Neil: So it’s about rhetorically framing the issue as 
something that is clearly beyond the realm of what 
is acceptable – in doing so, you hope to get people to 
realise that so much of what we don’t actually accept 
is happening on an ordinary basis?
Joanna: Exactly. The UK is a great example for this 
as we’ve seen such a shift over the last decade. Peo-
ple now report instances of everyday exploitation. 
Take car washes. A few years ago nobody really 
took notice of the working conditions at car wash-
es, or thought they were something to worry about. 
Now they say, ‘Oh, this thing, I know that isn›t 
right, slavery, oh my God, it›s happening here.’ And 
that›s not all. The thought continues with, ‘I want to 
do something about it.’ That›s my reason for using 
the language of modern slavery.
Neil: I certainly see the rhetorical power of the 
term, and I can certainly see the argument for us-
ing it as you have suggested here. At the same time, 
I’m still concerned that the extreme nature of the 
term modern slavery serves to make lesser forms 
of exploitation appear normal and a bit, well, ‘meh’. 
I’m worried people will say, ‘what’s happening over 
there isn’t an issue because it’s not modern slavery’.
Joanna: I think part of the problem is the fact that 
the messaging used by those on the inside doesn’t al-
ways support my proposal, or if you like my theory 
of change. A lot of the messaging that uses the term 
does what you’re describing – it normalises every-
day exploitation while sensationalising the extreme 
forms. That’s not helpful. It’s part of the problem. If 
it isn’t presented in the way that I›m describing – as 
a wider endemic problem – then of course it just 
makes you question the whole approach.
Neil: I appreciate that caveat. Modern slavery is 
also a term that seems to unite people across the 
political spectrum. There are folks taking a struc-
tural and more radical stance like you, but you’ve 
also got boardrooms, Tory politicians, billionaire 
philanthrocapitalists – people who typically are not 
aligned with any sort of progressive economic re-
form agenda. What does it say to you as someone 
who critically uses this term that so many pillars of 
the establishment also use it?
Joanna: Let’s go back to my example of the US Tariff 
Act, because I do genuinely wonder whether there›s 
any thought or conversation at the administrative 
level about the broader economic implications of 
implementing it properly. Withholding the goods 
is one thing, not insignificant, but are they actual-
ly going to try to get real evidence of what›s going 
on? Politics aside, this mechanism has the potential 
to lead to structural change, but whether it actually 
does of course remains to be seen.
I think, again, the UK is a great example here. The-
resa May, the previous prime minister, really hung 
her hat on tackling this issue whilst at the same 
time implementing a number of policies that actu-
ally perpetuated it. It really undermined the whole 
agenda because, on the one hand, the UK was po-
litically trying to cast itself as a leader in tackling 
modern slavery, while on the other hand essential-
ly pushing people into modern slavery through its 
incredibly restrictive and discriminatory immigra-
tion systems in particular.
I don’t know if it’s unique to modern slavery, but 
the concept certainly does have political attraction 
and at times the people using it are serving their 
own interests.
Neil: That’s the thing. In my analysis, when people 
like Theresa May or Donald Trump vociferously say 
‘I’m against modern slavery’ or ‘I’m against traffick-
ing’, what they’re doing is trying to position them-
selves as morally good. And so one of the things 
that worries me about this powerful terminology is 
that is provides a type of cover for politicians pre-
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siding over structures of discrimination and exclu-
sion. By associating themselves with modern slav-
ery or with trafficking, it allows them to claim that 
they’re good and they’re moral and that they stand 
with the downtrodden. As someone who uses this 
terminology and who engages with them, how do 
you respond to that?
Joanna:  I wouldn›t challenge what you just pre-
sented. I think it›s real. It’s also true for a lot of 
things. You could say the same thing about corpo-
rate responsibility more broadly. I have big ques-
tion marks myself around the ability for big busi-
ness to reverse engineer to be ethical operators. 
But I think we can say that there have been some 
improvements despite, perhaps, the political con-
flicts around the whole modern slavery agenda. The 
examples I gave around the general public and the 
UK being much more cognisant of the way that ex-
treme exploitation manifests itself today is really a 
result. And I think you can›t deny that it›s a result 
of the fact that we have had some very big names 
and very high-profile attention given to the lan-
guage. I don›t think it would have happened with-
out that language.
Neil: OK, but given your structural framing of this 
issue as well as your general politics, why don’t you 
go for broke and say, ‘borders are the issue’, or ‘cap-
italism is the issue’?
Joanna:  Interesting question. I guess right now I 
don’t see a specific opportunity to mobilise around. 
I am not against having a campaign around it. But 
I think the real challenge is, what chance is there to 
leverage change that is as big as that?
I think there are opportunities to leverage change in 
that in a small way – for example making sure that asy-
lum seekers have a right to work. That’s a really mini 
version of challenging the restrictions on people who 
come into the country. I don’t know what a campaign 
would look like that just said, ‘Let’s open our borders.’
That said, for more than fifteen years I’ve been in-
volved with an organisation called Global Justice 
Now. When they first started talking about open 
borders my first thought was, ‘Ooh, how’s that 
going to work?’ Historically they’ve worked suc-
cessfully on structural issues around trade justice. 
But it’s been really interesting to see how they’ve 
created space around the concept of open borders. 
I’ve been surprised that there has been the political 
space to do that. So I think it’s possible, but the way 
that Freedom United is structured as an institution 
means that we have to work within the structures 
that we have.
The other example you gave me was capitalism. 
Again, it’s a really, really big topic. How do you shift 
a whole world? You can try, but you’d definitely be 
on the outside and it’s hard to see how you could 
actually make progress. It’s not that we don’t see the 
problems, but we are trying to get some small im-
provements quickly enough that they will actually 
change lives right now.
Neil: So having a concrete leverage point with a con-
crete potential win is really important, as while ‘big 
change’ might be desirable it’s difficult to conceive of 
how you would organise to achieve it?
Joanna: That’s a fair recap. And I’d stress that you 
can get notable improvements from those small 
“How do you shift a whole world?”
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changes now, even if you›re doing them within the 
confines of a system that isn›t really in favour of 
what you’re trying to achieve.
There’s a slight chance that could be changing. 
Looking at global politics and trying to be opti-
mistic about it, which I almost never am, I’d say 
that thanks to Trump and the growth of national-
ism there is definitely now more space for radical 
conversations than there was. That’s a great thing. 
We’re seeing it in different ways, and if we can hook 
it to this framing of slavery that is supposedly inter-
nationally recognised as a human rights violation, 
then happy days.
Discrimination, which we haven’t talked about at all, 
is another one of those really clear systemic issues 
that is tightly connected to tolerance of exploitation.
It’s interesting to see how that’s been handled by ‘the 
inside’. Discrimination is recognised as an underly-
ing factor in exploitation, including extreme forms 
of exploitation that could be termed modern slavery. 
But it’s not being addressed systematically. We’ve 
talked about it quite a bit at Freedom United in our 
posts and in our content. But, returning to the point 
I made at the beginning, it’s more regularly framed 
as an aberration from a norm by others in the mod-
ern slavery space than as a systemic problem.
Neil: In my own research, I’ve found that many 
people who have been labelled by policy-making 
institutions or by the state as ‘victims of trafficking’ 
or as ‘victims of forced labour’ reject these terms. 
They experience these terms as somewhat dehu-
manising. They understand themselves as having 
chosen to do what they are doing because it was 
the best choice from among the available options, 
or because they saw it as a pathway to something 
better. What do you make of that? How does the 
rejection of the terms by the people labelled with 
them impact your thinking around using them?
Joanna: Good question. I think that this was a much 
more common position in the past than it is now. 
I remember being in a round table group of about 
twenty odd organisations that were working in this 
space about a decade ago. We were discussing the 
term modern slavery, and in particular we were 
asking what the people who have experienced it feel 
comfortable with and what they don’t feel comfort-
able with. At the time there were only two people in 
the room that felt comfortable with the term mod-
ern slavery, partly because of the exact reason you 
mentioned. There’s still a stigma attached to it and 
it’s not always something people want to be associ-
ated with, but I think it’s changing.
It once again all goes back to framing. There’s a real 
tendency in the sector to be very victimy towards 
those who are suffering. One of the things that I’ve 
talked and written about consistently is that it’s a 
bizarre sector in its lack of lived experience within 
it. You can’t imagine a gay rights movement with so 
few gay people working in it, or a disabled rights 
movement with everybody able bodied. But that’s 
close to what you’ve got in the anti-slavery sector. 
It’s really odd, and I think that is why you’ve got 
this failure to recognise how and when you use the 
language in a way that’s appropriate.
So we have to be able to back up our language use 
and be able to justify why we use the terms we do. 
But that doesn’t mean you can’t use the modern 
slavery label in a way that is respectful and empow-
ering for people who have lived experience. Making 
sure you do so is really important.
I completely get why many people reject the label. 
As an analogy, think about when you fall victim to 
a scam – you just feel like an idiot. ‘Oh, I can’t be-
lieve that happened to me.’ It’s a bad outcome, but 
it’s simply something that happened to you. Or, as 
you say, some people have little choice but to accept 
bad working conditions. They go into it knowingly 
and hope something half decent might come out of 
it. It’s at this point that you get into one of the mas-
sive questions in the sector: where is choice real in 
any given context?
Could you really choose to get into an unventilat-
ed container on the back of a lorry in Belgium to 
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cross the sea? Were you just really stupid about it? 
Or did you just think, ‘I can’t get a visa and so many 
other people have done this journey successfully, 
the driver says there’s no other way and that he will 
keep the ventilation going, so I just have to take that 
chance.’ Obviously, your whole judgement changes 
very dramatically according to what circumstances 
you’re in at that moment.
At the end of the day, I think you can say that even 
though Freedom United uses the language of traf-
ficking and modern slavery – a language that many 
people are uncomfortable with – we can still talk 
about survivors’ experiences and let their views 
and opinions form how we present their stories and 
narratives. This is why we’ve really pushed hard on 
our ‘My story, My Dignity’ campaign, which is all 
about representation and presentation. And I think 
it’s super important that we’re always reviewing 
how can we be better allies in the sector, because 
that’s what we are.
Neil: It’s heartening to hear this kind of critical 
self-awareness, especially because in my experience 
it’s not all that common in this sector. So if the goal 
is to help and improve as allies, what needs to change 
in the field to make that possible?
Joanna: First, we need to create a space where peo-
ple who have experience, who can very well articu-
late what needs to change, feel welcome. Second, we 
need to ensure that they have opportunities to be a 
part of the movement. And third, the opportunities 
need to exist for them to lead the movement. It’s 
mad that it’s so rare at the moment.
There are many different things that we can do to 
make that happen. A really simple thing is asking 
yourself how you communicate about the topic. 
How do you talk about it? How are you conveying 
people’s stories – how do you represent them and 
their experience? At Freedom United, we have peo-
ple with experience leading our campaigns. They 
communicate in their voice to our supporters.
For example, we recently sent out a story that was 
written by a man named Raymundo, who was traf-
ficked from Central America to California to work 
under coercion on a farm. Thankfully he›s now in 
decent farm work and so in a position to call for 
change in law so that there›s more control over for-
eign labour contractors – so they›re all licenced and 
regulated. We sent this message out in his words, 
under his name, in both Spanish and English. An-
other of our campaigns, on ending forced child 
marriage in the UK, is fronted by Payzee Mahmod 
– a woman who, along with her sister Banaz, was 
forced into marriage by their father at sixteen and 
seventeen years old. Payzee has been campaigning 
for change and so the obvious person to speak to 
Freedom United supporters.
When people with lived experience front cam-
paigns then it leads to better communications. If 
you’ve got no perspectives from people who’ve 
experienced it, I’m not surprised then that you’re 
not creating appropriate content or that you’re not 
working in a way that creates space for them to be 
part of what you’re doing. And these are really sim-
ple things that can be done right now.
The lack of their voices, of their presence, of their 
leadership is such a systemic issue. It’s not surpris-
ing, because many survivors are too busy trying to 
navigate often complex and restrictive immigra-
tion systems, and access the support they need to 
recover, basically survive the day to day. Not all, of 
course, but many. They face discrimination in so 
many ways, and it makes it very difficult for them 
to have the opportunity to lead in this space.
This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.
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Anti-trafficking has always been an ‘inside job’. This 
is true in at least two ways. First, we have an alliance 
between anti-trafficking organisations and state 
officials, who have worked together to embed the 
anti-trafficking framework into both international 
agreements and national and local laws. This alliance 
has actively dismissed the concerns of feminists, in-
cluding sex workers, who have spoken up about the 
harms that tend to occur whenever anybody gets 
it in their head to ‘save women and children’. It has 
also sidelined evidence that anti-trafficking measures 
tend to intensify the harms already being done by 
immigration and anti-sex work policies.
Secondly, we have organisations who have used an-
ti-trafficking and the access and influence it enables 
to advance other aspects of their agenda. Groups 
seeking to abolish sex work are the prime culprits 
here. Abolitionist campaigners have successfully 
harnessed sympathy for trafficking victims to fur-
ther criminalise sex work, harass sex workers and 
their clients, and deny safe and law-bound routes of 
intra- and international migration for sex workers. 
Under the guise of anti-trafficking, in many juris-
dictions previous victories gained by sex workers 
have been rolled back and sex workers have become 
more exposed to the punitive power of the state.
Follow the anti-trafficking money
Anti-trafficking crusaders have furthermore en-
riched themselves by being on the inside. They have 
financially benefitted from the funds civil society 
organisations and government agencies give out to 
‘combat trafficking’, and acquired social capital by 
establishing lifelong connections and networks with 
the powerful and wealthy. As  Cynthia Enloe has 
demonstrated, protecting women and children has 
long been a powerful tool for soliciting sympathy, 
money, and weapons. And anti-trafficking is indeed 
a well-oiled machine: the Trump administration 
alone has authorised approximately $430 million to 
“fight sex and labor trafficking” since 2016.
This is a mutually beneficial alliance. The flow of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the United States 
to organisations fighting ‘modern-day slavery’ 
has played a major role in drawing attention away 
from government policies on immigration, free 
trade, employment, the environment, and public 
welfare. Talking about ‘traffickers’ and ‘smugglers’ 
is not only an effective way of closing down other 
conversations, it also enables nation-states who 
would otherwise be defined by their anti-migrant, 
anti-environment, anti-women, anti-worker, and 
anti-poor policies to be viewed as the saviours and 
protectors of ‘victims of trafficking’.
This is no small benefit to nation-states. Look again 
at the Trump administration’s support and fund-
ing for anti-trafficking measures, which has been a 
hallmark of this administration. Since taking office, 
Trump has had a full-time appointee overseeing an-
ti-trafficking initiatives and signed three executive 
orders and eight bills expressly targeting human 
trafficking. Trump has presented this as  “fighting 
for the voiceless”.
Yet “the voiceless” to which Trump refers clearly 
does not include anyone affected by Trump’s im-
migration policies, including those harmed by the 
effective ending of lawful routes of migration to the 
United States, the implementation of a ‘Muslim ban’ 
(which reintroduces racism into US immigration 
law), the interdiction of asylum seekers at the US’s 
southern border, and the organised abandonment 
of would-be refugees in hazardous, make-shift 
Anti-trafficking is an inside job
Nandita Sharma
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camps in Mexico. Most egregiously, Trump’s con-
cern for the most vulnerable does not extend to the 
separation of children from their caregiving adults 
as part of his administration’s “zero tolerance” pol-
icy – an especially vicious tactic to try and thwart 
future migration to the United States.
The voices of the people harmed by Trump’s an-
ti-immigrant policies have not been prioritised by 
anti-trafficking activists either. It is no accident that 
most anti-trafficking organisations have failed to 
speak out against each and every one of Trump’s 
anti-immigration policies. On the contrary, many 
have stood beside Trump and his daughter Ivanka 
and applauded their anti-trafficking initiatives. 
Marking one such occasion, the twentieth anniver-
sary of the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
on 31 January 2020, Trump  commented  that his 
policies were a response to a “level of evil that you 
would never believe is even possible in a modern 
age. The level of evil is incredible.” The evil he was 
referring to was definitely not his administration’s 
continuing failure to reunite over 600 hundred chil-
dren whom they separated from their parents.
Anti-trafficking or anti-immigrant?
There is further evidence of this symbiotic relation-
ship between the anti-trafficking and anti-immigrant 
agendas. Notably, recent policies aimed at virtually 
eliminating asylum in the US have been reframed as 
humanitarian measures to “reduce illegal trafficking 
and human trafficking, as well as forced migration”. 
This is how Trump described his 2019 signing of a 
“bilateral cooperation agreement on security and 
migration” with El Salvador, as well as others signed 
with Honduras, and Guatemala. These agreements 
ensure that anyone seeking refuge in the US who has 
traversed these refugee producing states would no 
longer have the right to do so.
The strategic appeal of ‘combatting trafficking’ goes 
well beyond the United States. El Salvador’s foreign 
minister, Alexandra Hill, justified their participa-
tion in the bilateral agreement by invoking the re-
cent deaths of a father and daughter from El Salva-
dor who drowned in June 2019 in the Rio Grande. 
Claiming that their deaths “hit El Salvador in the 
heart”, Hill said the agreement would help El Sal-
vador “avoid” such deaths. Yet this humanitarian 
rhetoric provides political cover for El Salvador’s 
endorsement of Trump’s efforts to further close 
routes of migration to the US, thereby increasing 
the danger to those who try.
This provides a clear-eyed glimpse into what an-
ti-trafficking means to nation-states: legitimising 
anti-immigrant policies. The diversion of refugees 
from the US to El Salvador (or Guatemala or Hon-
duras) is justified by invoking ‘evil traffickers’, yet 
they are merely a prop held up to distract attention 
away from the US’s increasingly severe policies 
on immigration. Self-interested efforts to prevent 
movement are transformed into a shared human-
itarian project to ‘combat trafficking’. Again, mon-
ey greases the wheel: while it currently remains 
unclear what El Salvador or Honduras will receive 
“Talking about ‘traffickers’ and ‘smugglers’ enables nation-states who 
would otherwise be defined as anti-migrant to be viewed as the 
saviours and protectors of ‘victims of trafficking’.”
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from the US to ensure that refugees are unable to 
claim asylum there, the Trump administration has 
agreed to transfer $40 million to the United Nations 
refugee agency to effectively warehouse migrants in 
Guatemala, including those deported from the US.
This brings into focus a key question: how would 
the intensifying labyrinth of immigration restric-
tions be perceived in the absence of anti-trafficking 
measures? Would ever more draconian immigra-
tion laws be as easy to justify or to enforce if they 
could not be sanitised as humanitarian efforts to 
‘protect migrants’? My answer – drawing upon my 
own research  into how anti-trafficking rhetoric 
has led to unauthorised migration becoming more 
dangerous and more expensive – is no. The wide 
dissemination of the fear of traffickers has been in-
tegral to efforts to harm migrants.
Anti-trafficking conspiracies
By presenting themselves as ‘saviours’, anti-traffickers 
have secured prestige and authority within societies 
which have become obsessed with the trafficking of 
women and children. It should come as no surprise 
that this is an obsession which they have played no 
small part in fomenting. Even far-right conspiracy 
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theories have by this point jumped on the anti-traf-
ficking bandwagon as a way of re-presenting them-
selves as rescuers of victims and not victimisers.
This has most recently manifested in the social media 
phenomenon of QAnon, which draws upon long-
standing fears about a vast network of traffickers who 
conspire to harm women and children. The QAnon 
slogan, “save the children”, borrows directly from the 
rhetoric accompanying efforts to ‘combat trafficking’. 
Indeed, the use of this slogan has increased the popu-
larity of QAnon – and, unsurprisingly, the popularity 
of Trump. QAnon adherents believe the current pres-
ident is secretly fighting a network of liberal Holly-
wood celebrities and Democrats supposedly running 
a child trafficking ring. President Trump’s tacit sup-
port of QAnon aligns with his own anti-trafficking 
agenda. Both incorrectly portray Trump as the pro-
tector of women and children.
Some 150 anti-trafficking organisations recently 
denounced QAnon in an open letter, which stated 
that it misrepresents the extent of the phenomenon 
of trafficking as well as its root causes. The letter 
maintains that “we need policies that address sys-
temic vulnerabilities of children to both sex traf-
ficking and forced labor,” yet it once again remains 
silent when it comes to Trump’s own misrepresenta-
tion and strategic manipulation of the concept of 
trafficking. It is clear that the women and children 
these organisations purport to care for have been 
adversely affected by Trump’s policies, yet they find 
ways to look the other way.
There is an alternative path available to anti-traf-
ficking organisations if they want to take it. If peo-
ple seriously want to protect women and children 
then they should spend their energies trying to re-
form national immigration policies to make them 
less restrictive, less punitive, and less about deport-
ing or caging people. Instead of giving lip-service 
to the systemic vulnerabilities of ‘victims of traf-
ficking’, they would put their combined weight 
into exposing and challenging the very logics of 
nationalism and global capitalism that prevent 
most people from safely moving between national-
ised territories. While this path is available to such 
organisations in theory, it is unlikely to be taken 
in practice. Walking it would mean upending the 
mutually beneficial alliance between anti-traffick-
ing organisations and the nation-state, and thereby 
complicating all of the access, financial gain, and 
influence it generates.
It is well past time to jettison the entire framework 
of anti-trafficking by recognising that national bor-
der controls are meant to deny people their free-
dom. Border controls are designed to harm and are 
dedicated to destroying planetary solidarity. An-
ti-trafficking crusaders are part of the problem and 
play no part in the solution.
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Shortcomings of the implementation of the 
2000 Palermo Protocol
Since the late 1990s I have been committed to es-
tablishing, implementing, and monitoring an-
ti-trafficking legislation and policies. This includes 
a six-year tenure as United Nations Special Rap-
porteur on trafficking in persons especially women 
and children, which ended in July 2020. As many 
people will already be aware, the prevention of and 
fight against human trafficking has also been closely 
linked with the struggle against slavery. When the 
2000 Palermo Protocol on trafficking was negotiat-
ed it was motivated by a desire to define and address 
trafficking as a modern form of slavery.
After twenty years of visiting, monitoring, and 
learning about experiences in many countries, I 
have serious concerns about the effectiveness of 
anti-trafficking legislation and policies, and about 
the degree to which they align with a human rights-
based approach. To my mind, the key issues are:
1. Human trafficking and slavery tend to be inter-
preted on restrictive terms, and the number of 
criminal proceedings for both trafficking and 
slavery remains very low world-wide. The con-
sequence has been not only widespread impuni-
ty but also the denial of victims’ rights.
2. Prevention is not really addressed, or is limited 
to awareness raising campaigns. These are not 
always useful, since many neither address the 
right audience nor send the right message.
3. The gendered dimension of trafficking, and the 
role of patriarchal structures in the production 
of women’s vulnerabilities, are usually not un-
derstood.
4. Trafficking for labour exploitation is only rarely 
addressed within established law enforcement 
anti-trafficking paradigms.
5. Victim identification rates remain very low 
worldwide. States have failed to identify traf-
ficked persons among mixed migration flows, 
and governmental support measures for traf-
ficking victims are often limited to short-term 
assistance and do not ensure full social inclu-
sion of survivors.
6. While civil society-led activities are generally 
inspired by a human rights-based approach, 
government-led anti-trafficking actions have 
contributed to further violations of victims’ 
rights. For example, multiple governments have 
established so-called ‘closed shelters’, where vic-
tims are supposed to be protected but are actu-
ally subjected to ad-ministrative detention.
7. Finally, and importantly, remedies are very 
rarely awarded to victims of trafficking or slav-
ery. As a result, the promise of a human rights-
based approach ends up being nullified, since 
the right to receive compensation as an outcome 
of criminal or other judicial proceedings is rare-
ly realised in practice. This is one of a number 
of reasons why victims are not encouraged to 
come forward and report exploitation.
Law enforcement led anti-trafficking and anti-slav-
ery actions are mostly failing. The full involvement 
of the business community, trade unions, and civil 
society is needed to tackle labour exploitation, es-
pecially through effective actions aimed at empow-
ering workers, promoting respect of their rights, 
and cleaning supply chains. Some governments and 
Are our laws cut out for addressing systemic exploitation?
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affluent private sponsors have helped to mobilise 
important energies within the business communi-
ty, but problems remain when it comes to the inef-
fectiveness of voluntary initiatives adopted by the 
private sector. For example, prominent anti-slavery 
and transparency laws impose only reporting obli-
gations on businesses. They should instead compel 
businesses to take action to eradicate exploitation 
from their supply chains. There is also the risk that 
focusing upon slavery means concentrating upon 
the worst cases of exploitation, with the conse-
quence that extensive exploitation – which is en-
demic in supply chains – goes unnoticed.
Political tactics and strategic planning
This debate asks whether we can more effectively 
improve workers’ lives from inside the anti-traffick-
ing and modern slavery system or from outside of 
it. I would say that the human rights community 
should be simultaneously IN and OUT. We should 
be IN as a matter of political tactics, and OUT as a 
matter of strategic thinking.
From the point of view of political tactics, the hu-
man rights community should continue to use all 
the existing tools at its disposal to re-orient imple-
mentation of anti-trafficking and anti-slavery leg-
islation and policies according to a human rights-
based approach, and to promote more effective 
victim support.
The results of anti-trafficking actions are modest 
globally, especially when placed alongside the esti-
mated global dimensions of trafficking and slavery. 
However, existing interventions have worked out 
for a considerable number of individuals. From a 
human rights point of view, every person gaining 
freedom and autonomy makes a difference.
However, from a strategic point of view, the human 
rights community needs to invest in a new global hu-
man rights instrument and innovative national legis-
lation focusing on a broader notion of exploitation. 
In this direction, three topics should be prioritised:
Prevention  as a strategic approach to labour ex-
ploitation. This implies effective action by govern-
ments and businesses based on a mix of voluntary 
schemes and binding provisions. Such provisions 
would impose specific obligations on parent com-
panies to identify risks in their supply chains, estab-
lish plans to address them, and put in place viable 
solutions for workers losing their jobs when se-
vere exploitation is identified. National legislation 
should furthermore establish corporate liability for 
parent companies not complying with such obli-
gations, as well as tackle recruitment and interme-
diation practices while also strengthening labour 
inspections. In all of this a clear firewall between 
labour checks and immigration controls must be 
maintained at all times.
Effective remedies  for exploited persons. The en-
tire range of remedies for human rights violations 
must be made available, including restitution, res-
toration, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, 
and guarantee of non-repetition. Such remedy 
should not hinge solely on the outcome of crimi-
nal proceedings, but could also come through ju-
dicial and non-judicial complaint mechanisms as 
“From a human rights point of view, every person gaining freedom 
and autonomy makes a difference.”
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well. Importantly, such remedies include not only 
financial redress but also regularisation of migra-
tion status, family reunification, and restoration of 
employment. Access to remedies is a right of any 
exploited person, as well as a powerful means to en-
sure their empowerment and full social inclusion.
Early support  to exploited persons or people at 
risk of exploitation, especially among the migrant 
population. This will not only prevent their further 
exploitation and promote their social inclusion, but 
it will also allow them to access help irrespective of 
their formal identification as victims of crime. Civil 
society organisations should be funded to provide 
counselling, healthcare, and other necessary assis-
tance measures for such vulnerable persons.
In conclusion, the ‘IN  and  OUT’ option requires 
the ability to achieve concrete results on the basis of 
existing regulations and mechanisms, while at the 
same time being aware of their flaws and actively 
promoting new approaches.
Following Bell Hooks and her feminist theory, I 
would choose the ‘margin’ as a space of radical crit-
icism and openness to new ideas. From the margin 
we can be IN and OUT, taking every opportunity to 
improve victim support and simultaneously devel-
oping new strategic plans.
I’m convinced that the daily struggle for the re-
spect of victims’ rights can be more successful if it 
is carried out with a clear perspective of a strate-
gic shift from the trafficking and slavery standards 
to the notion of systemic exploitation. Such a shift 
requires an exceptional commitment by the whole 
human rights community to elaborate on the idea 
of a new global instrument addressing exploitation, 
to identify its scope, purposes, and contents, and to 
promote a substantive discussion at international, 
regional, and national level.
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Two decades after the United Nations adopted a 
protocol against human trafficking (the UN Pro-
tocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, sup-
plementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime), enough time has 
passed to comment on the most salient aspects of 
what has gone right and what has gone wrong.
During these decades the international community 
could have made great strides towards ending the 
types of exploitation included in the protocol as hu-
man trafficking, namely “the exploitation of the pros-
titution of others or other forms of sexual exploita-
tion, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.
However, the balance sheet after twenty years shows 
something else. This is in part because the protocol 
was linked to a convention against organised crime 
as well as a second protocol aimed at penalising 
‘people smugglers’ for helping migrants to cross 
borders illicitly. Most measures taken since 2000 
have focused on strengthening law enforcement 
agencies and prosecuting criminals. They have 
not addressed the causes of exploitation or sought 
to reduce its occurrence. The smuggling proto-
col furthermore made it harder to distinguish the 
benevolent brokers helping irregular migrants to 
cross borders from the sharks preying on migrants, 
while legitimising government attempts to equate 
the two. As a result, the past two decades have seen 
the world’s wealthy countries institute a range of 
hostile measures to prevent refugees and irregular 
migrants from entering their territories.
The trafficking protocol focuses on what is suppos-
edly a quite different form of abuse: the recruitment 
(which sometimes involves crossing borders) of 
people (women and girls, but also men and boys) 
“for the purpose of exploitation”. It has resulted 
in countless law reforms and tens of thousands of 
police being trained to identify and investigate the 
crime of trafficking. This has led to an increase in 
prosecutions and convictions of traffickers. How-
ever, the structural causes of exploitation remain 
unaddressed: the vast inequalities in income and 
power within and between countries, the system-
atic discrimination practiced throughout the world 
against migrant workers, and a continuing trend to 
abandon conventional employment relationships 
and regulation of the labour market.
A fig leaf for repression
In practice, many of the actions taken in the name 
of stopping trafficking have had the effect of harm-
ing migrants and people who have been trafficked. 
Measures against irregular migrants have been re-
peatedly justified by politicians as ‘rescuing’ traf-
ficking victims. Rich country governments have ex-
ploited the issue of trafficking (and the related one of 
‘modern slavery’) to advance their own interests at 
the expense of the very people they claim to be pro-
tecting. Several countries have used their anti-traf-
ficking or anti-slavery agendas like a fig leaf, while 
simultaneously implementing repressive policies 
that violate human rights. The USA embarked on an 
anti-trafficking crusade while putting its version of 
Hitler’s ‘Nacht und Nebel’ order into action, creating 
terror through disappearances and torture in the af-
termath of the September 2001 attacks on New York 
and Washington DC. The United Kingdom started 




focusing on ‘modern slavery’ after its government 
made it a priority to create a ‘hostile environment’ 
for migrants and to deport as many as possible.
Countless governments have been selective about 
which types of exploitation they want their crim-
inal justice system to target. Before the provisions 
of the trafficking protocol had even been finalised, 
it was clear that the USA, Sweden, and various oth-
er countries wanted to use it to stop prostitution in 
general (claiming that all or most sex workers were 
trafficked). Predictably, sex workers who have not 
been trafficked have protested that anti-trafficking 
measures seek to deprive them of an income or to 
push them into more hazardous working condi-
tions. The two decades since 2000 have not resolved 
the differences in approach between the anti-pros-
titution crusaders and others.
The preoccupation with commercial sex has been 
less dominant since 2010. The International Labour 
Organization adopted a convention about domestic 
workers in 2011 and a protocol on forced labour 
in 2014 (supplementing its original 1930 Conven-
tion on Forced Labour). In theory this should have 
resulted in more action to protect migrant work-
ers who were forced to work, whether in private 
homes, workshops, fields or at sea. Yet implemen-
tation has been once again influenced by the pri-
orities and inclinations of governments. Big busi-
ness has also been more concerned with the steps 
they are supposed to take under the UN’s Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), 
which have been side-tracked to a worrying extent 
by the requirement to publicly state what is being 
done to ensure that suppliers do not exploit work-
ers. So far these statements, which can be crafted to 
sound marvellous, have divulged little about what 
is happening in practice.
Lessons not learned
Many hundreds of millions of dollars and euros 
collected from taxpayers in industrialised coun-
tries have paid for projects around the world to 
‘stop trafficking’ or ‘stop modern slavery’. However, 
instead of building on knowledge and experience, 
these have repeatedly reinvented the wheel. Instead 
of choosing the most effective implementing part-
ners and the methods most likely to succeed, many 
governments have preferred to channel funds to 
organisations with an ideology of which they ap-
prove. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been 
channelled to avowedly Christian organisations, 
in effect subordinating the anti-trafficking and an-
ti-slavery agendas to that of Christian churches.
Projects also suffer from the way in which they are 
handed out. They often go to the cheapest bidder 
rather than to groups with real expertise, and the 
inexperienced staff of the former frequently do not 
apply or are simply unaware of previous lessons 
learned. Sometimes no lessons are learnt at all. The 
lifespans of individual projects are generally short 
and they rarely achieve their objectives. As a result, 
after two decades it is still common to see comments 
such as “we haven’t had time to learn what works”.
Patronage for anti-trafficking programmes has also 
been a tool in the ‘divide and rule’ approach that 
powerful governments have taken to the United 
Nations system, in which different UN organi-
sations are pitted against each other rather than 
pushed to cooperatively identify best practice. In-
deed, the very phrase ‘best practice’ has been sub-
verted to add gloss to the many anti-trafficking 
methods used by different organisations – there is 
no international forum that agrees on these things.
Private sector donors have also made large amounts 
of money available for anti-trafficking work. Some 
quietly and effectively support local initiatives away 
from the limelight. Others seem to think that dom-
inating the headlines should be given priority. Their 
publicity focuses mainly on numbers (of ‘modern 
slaves’ or ‘trafficking victims’). One was established 
in 2013 with a commitment to reduce the number 
of people in modern slavery, but instead revised its 
way of counting who this involves and consequent-
ly doubled the number involved. The numbers 
game has been a good way of grabbing headlines, 
but not an effective way of protecting people.
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Is it reasonable to conclude that powerful govern-
ments (and private donors) have used the past two 
decades to ‘play’ with the issues of human traf-
ficking and modern slavery, rather than to devote 
energy and resources to stopping the worst forms 
of exploitation? This sounds very unfair on the po-
lice, health workers, social workers and non-gov-
ernmental organisations that have worked to catch 
criminals and protect victims. Nevertheless, my 
conclusion is that politicians and decision-makers 
at the top have acted as saboteurs. A quite differ-
ent agenda is needed to protect migrants and other 
job-seekers from poor communities, and to chal-
lenge both the discrimination and oppression that 
characterise today’s global economy.
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For anyone interested in the rights of sex workers, 
the twentieth anniversary of the Palermo Protocol 
is an unmissable chance to evaluate how sex work-
ers have been impacted by anti-trafficking rheto-
ric and policy. Whatever opportunities Palermo 
might have initially presented, it is now inextricably 
aligned with harmful ideological agendas that sex 
workers are obliged to resist and reject.
For decades now, sex workers in Europe have been 
combatting calls to ‘abolish prostitution’. These have 
gained prominence via the conflation of trafficking 
and sex work. Researchers have repeatedly demon-
strated that this conflation is flawed, yet it continues 
to be championed by opponents of the ‘sex work is 
work’ approach.
At the heart of this dispute is the so-called Swedish 
Model. Born one year before the Palermo Protocol, 
this policy criminalises the clients of sex workers in 
order to end demand for sex work and, its propo-
nents would believe, for trafficked women. Despite 
its many flaws, this model has now been adopted in 
Norway, Ireland, France, Northern Ireland, Israel, 
and Canada. Other countries are currently debating 
whether to adopt it as well. Meanwhile, both the pro-
tocol’s and the Swedish Model’s overwhelming focus 
on criminal justice has channelled immense resources 
into the investigation and prosecution of traffickers, as 
well as into programmes designed to prohibit prosti-
tution in all but name.
Criminalisation that harms
Despite political rhetoric framing anti-trafficking 
work as grounded in human rights, punitive ap-
proaches remain dominant. To a large extent, an-
ti-trafficking has come to mean the criminalisation 
of users of services and goods produced by victims. 
Thanks to the blanket conflation of sex work and 
trafficking, combating trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation has thus translated into criminalising the 
users (clients) of all sex workers.
The vulnerabilities brought on by the criminalisation 
of demand have been exacerbated by the criminali-
sation of facilitating sex work. This is often assumed 
to be a provision against abusive pimps, but under 
repressive prostitution and anti-trafficking regimes 
it goes much further. Any third-party facilitation 
of prostitution risks arrest and prosecution, and no 
distinction is drawn between abusive employers and 
groups of sex workers working together for safety. 
Thanks to laws such as FOSTA/SESTA in the United 
States, third party criminalisation has extended into 
the digital realm, with websites, applications, and on-
line advertising platforms being shut down for facili-
tating prostitution and/or trafficking.
Much of this opposition to sex work has come from 
conservatives, who continue to understand sex 
in terms of purity and male control over women. 
However, the most visible champions of the confla-
tion of sex work and trafficking have been radical 
feminists. Sometimes also described as ‘carceral 
feminists’, these individuals have made the crimi-
nalisation of the purchase of sex their central de-
mand and rallying cry despite the harmful effects it 
brings to sex working communities.
To help make their case, these radical feminists 
have amplified the voices of some survivors of hu-
man trafficking. But they are highly selective. They 
Missed opportunities and exclusion: sex workers 
reflect on two decades of anti-trafficking
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don’t want to hear from survivors who demand a 
rights-based approach to migration and the de-
criminalisation of sex work. Individual stories of 
victims and villains must instead take centre stage, 
while politicians, activists, and the general public 
are allowed to play the self-gratifying role of sav-
iours. Much less attention is paid to the context 
within which the crime of human trafficking takes 
place, or to the root causes and factors that exacer-
bate vulnerabilities extending far beyond the nar-
row focus of trafficking.
Sex workers are agents of change
So what choices do sex workers and sex worker organ-
isations have if they want to address exploitation and 
vulnerability in the sex industry? Some collectives ex-
plicitly state that trafficking and modern slavery are 
unnecessary concepts that were forced onto the Glob-
al South by the Global North. Others try their best, 
despite a critical lack of funding, to leverage anti-traf-
ficking spaces in order to amplify the voices of sex 
workers and to prevent harmful policymaking.
Since its inaugural European Conference on Sex 
Work, Human Rights, Labour and Migration in 
2005, the International Committee on the Rights of 
Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) has always under-
stood and conceptualised trafficking as a migration 
and labour rights issue. However, this has not trans-
lated into sustained engagement with anti-traffick-
ing stakeholders and policymaking mechanisms. 
This is partly due to a lack of resources. But it also 
reflects a recognition that sex workers are not wel-
come in anti-trafficking spaces, where a dogmatic 
approach to prostitution as a form of slavery pre-
vails. It’s exhausting and dispiriting to routinely en-
ter into conversations where sex workers’ voices are 
ignored and misrepresented as ‘pro-trafficking’, or 
as a ‘disguise for pimps and traffickers’, so we have 
been careful about where and when we engage.
That said, over the last few years ICRSE and sever-
al of its members have increased their engagement 
with anti-trafficking policies and platforms, with 
various degrees of success. This is reflected in a 
recent collaborative partnership framework facil-
itated by ICRSE under the banner of ‘Rights not 
Rescue’. This framework seeks to add a fifth ‘P’ to 
the globally established ‘4 Ps’ approach. In addition 
to prevention, protection, prosecution, and part-
nership, we would add policies that don’t harm and 
don’t exacerbate vulnerabilities.
Despite widespread rhetoric regarding the need 
for victim-centred approaches to anti-trafficking 
interventions, the viewpoints and experiences of 
communities that are vulnerable to human traffick-
ing are routinely ignored because they are regarded 
as politically inconvenient. This is chiefly because 
the most impacted communities comprise undoc-
umented migrants and precarious and often infor-
mal sector workers, including sex workers. Sus-
tained engagement with these groups would reveal 
that there are no easy solutions, such as punishing 
individual perpetrators. It would instead under-
score the need to grapple with larger questions of 
security, migration, labour and social justice poli-
cies, and the design of economic systems.
Human trafficking and modern-day slavery have 
been sometimes described as global epidemics. This 
analogy isn’t very helpful, so let instead use a real 
pandemic: the HIV/AIDS crisis. As part of this cri-
sis, sex working communities have been recognised 
as one of the key affected communities whose voic-
es and experiences are crucial to formulating policy 
responses. International organisations and policy 
makers focusing upon HIV/AIDS tend to behave 
quite differently to their human trafficking coun-
terparts. In the HIV/AIDS policy field,  UNAIDS, 
WHO, UNFPA, and UNDP have called for the de-
criminalisation of sex work and elimination of un-
just non-criminal laws and regulations against sex 
workers. They also recognise that violence against 
sex workers must be prevented and addressed  in 
partnership with sex workers and their organisa-
tions, and that sex workers and their organisations 
should be meaningfully included in policymaking. 
And, finally and most importantly, they have found 
that, in the context of consensual adult sex and sex 
work, criminal laws actually cause harm, especially 
for already marginalised groups. Criminal sanc-
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tions against sex work contravene a number of hu-
man rights, including the right to equality before 
the law and equal protection of the law without dis-
crimination; the right to be free from cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment; and 
the rights to privacy and to health.
These responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis point to a 
vastly more constructive model of engagement than 
the rescue, rehabilitation, and intensified policing 
associated with anti-trafficking. As a rule, anti-traf-
ficking victims are viewed as people who lack agency 
and who need to be rescued and rehabilitated. The 
meaningful inclusion of affected communities with-
in anti-trafficking approaches would undercut this 
simplistic model, and enable a fundamental shift 
away from a narrow criminal justice approach and 
towards an economic and social justice approach 
grounded in migrant and worker rights.
Under this broader approach the criminalisation of 
migration and the sanctioning of undeclared work-
ers would be recognised as barriers that exacerbate 
vulnerabilities. Undocumented migrants and in-
formal workers, including sex workers, would be 
supported in their unionisation efforts. Sex work-
ers and their organisations would be consulted and 
involved in anti-trafficking and anti-violence poli-
cies and interventions. Communities in vulnerable 
positions would be seen as agents of change, not 
agency-less subjects in need of rescue. Human and 
labour rights could be recognised and respected.
Not enough for a ‘modern-day slave’
Around ten years ago there was a shift in the termi-
nology: ‘modern-day slavery’ – an idea not embed-
ded in international legislation – began to be used 
interchangeably with the legally defined crime of 
human trafficking. This shift had important effects. 
The modern-day slavery terminology intensifies the 
focus on exceptional cases of abuse and exploitation, 
which enables states to concentrate support and help 
on victims of the worst of the worst. People who are 
deemed to have ‘suffered less’ remain under the ra-
dar and fall through the cracks of an eroding social 
safety net. People who experience everyday abuse 
and exploitation are not regarded as modern-day 
slaves, and can therefore be detained, deported, or 
sanctioned for their undeclared labour or other mi-
gration- or prostitution-related offences.
This is illustrated by ICRSE’s  latest community 
research, which was realised in partnership with 
twelve sex worker rights organisations from ten Eu-
ropean countries. Our final report found that sex 
workers whose victimisation was classified as hu-
man trafficking were able to receive adequate sup-
port and referrals to services. Experiences that did 
not meet the threshold associated with human traf-
ficking were more often than not greeted with in-
difference. In some cases filing a complaint resulted 
in threats of eviction or, in the case of migrant sex 
workers, deportation. We saw no evidence of cases 
of everyday abuse being referred to victim support 
services, despite high-level investment from Euro-
pean institutions in programmes to prevent vio-
lence against women and marginalised groups.
Sex workers and their organisations continue 
to  challenge punitive anti-trafficking policy  frame-
works that target their workplaces and clients, rather 
than traffickers. Over the last twenty years, sex work-
ers have not only had to combat the criminalisation 
of sex work, but have also endured global crises such 
as the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing COV-
ID-19 pandemic. They have also been faced with 
the erosion of human rights, shrinking civil society 
spaces, and volatile political environments.
Prostitution prohibitionists claim that trafficking 
increases in times of public crisis, but the reality is 
that poverty, precarity, and the need to cross bor-
ders to obtain a better life are the key factors lead-
ing people to sell sex. The post-COVID recession 
will be a crucial time to determine which approach 
is best suited to protect those most at risk in our 
society. Do we want a punitive approach that de-
nies the root factors making people vulnerable to 
exploitation and trafficking? Or a community-led 
approach, where sex workers engage with policy-
makers and other marginalised communities to 
shape the decisions that will affect their lives?
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Neil Howard (BTS): You’ve been a part of the Ameri-
can labour movement for a long time. If the goal is to 
improve workers’ lives, do we need to push for incre-
mental changes on ‘the inside’ or use the freedom of 
‘the outside’ to fight for a new vision?
Cathy Feingold (AFL-CIO): I think you need both. 
The world is experiencing a crisis of multilateralism 
right now – our existing multilateral framework is 
not fit for purpose. It was built in a very different 
moment. So, as activists and as organised labour, 
we need to be working on the inside to renew this 
framework. We need to try to build out a global 
architecture that’s useful to us, so that we can then 
use it as a tool for our organising. At the same time, 
we absolutely have to be on the outside pushing for 
a new vision. What should the next iteration of a 
multilateral approach look like? What systems do 
we need to build?
It’s not either/or. If we were having an academic 
conversation, you and I would just talk about the 
system we want and need. And we do need to spend 
time re-envisioning the global framework so that 
we are constantly realigning our strategies. But the 
reality is, I have to go to work and try to implement 
something to make change happen. We need both 
insiders and outsiders for that to work. Insiders, 
mind you, need to have their eyes wide open to the 
fact that the system they’re working within is not 
fit for purpose. It was built for a different set of rea-
sons. And it’s struggling right now.
Neil: Could you concretely spell out the benefits of 
working within the system? From an advocacy stand-
point, what works about working on the inside?
Cathy: For example, as a labour movement we believe 
that there is power in negotiation and in tripartism 
between workers, governments, and business. Many 
of our current systems were built in a moment where 
there was respect for tripartism. Governments, trade 
unions and civil society, and business leaders came 
together to try to shape responses to some of the big-
gest global challenges that we had.
There is still value in that. Take the International 
Labour Organization’s new convention and recom-
mendation to end violence and harassment in the 
workplace. It’s being ratified all over the world, and 
that will give movements new tools and new ways 
of talking about transforming their reality. That’s 
important. It’s important when you go to countries 
and say, ‘employers agreed to this, governments 
agreed to this. This is not just an outsider approach, 
but it’s something that we’ve all shaped together.’ We 
need to have that ability to build global architecture 
with various players at the table.
Unfortunately, the multilateral system is becoming 
increasingly dysfunctional and unable to respond 
to the enormous challenges the world faces. Just 
look at the World Trade Organization these days, 
or some other UN bodies and processes. And so we 
constantly need to be on the outside asking, ‘what 
are the tools that we need? Which tools don’t we 
have to build the vision or the framework that we 
need to really transform our communities?’
Neil: So you need people on both the inside and the 
outside, and a degree of coordination between the 
two. Those on the outside provide the vision and 
open up the Overton window, while those on the 
INTERVIEW
Why the AFL-CIO both sits at the table and marches 
in the streets
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inside actually leverage power for change.
Cathy: Correct. Often when shaping policies, if you 
just had an outsider approach, if you just protested 
in the street and no one listened to you, would you 
really be able to implement and shape a new vision? 
Probably not. But if you pair up protestors putting 
pressure on the multilateral system with insiders 
trying their best to build a framework that we’ll be 
able to use on the outside, that back and forth can 
be really powerful.
Neil: In theory it sounds excellent, but to what ex-
tent does coordination actually exist between loud 
voices saying radical things on the outside and 
those taking the longer road on the inside?
Cathy: As far as the labour movement goes, I think 
we often have one foot in each place. We are march-
ing in the street with our allies, whether we’re un-
happy at what’s being discussed at the G20 or at 
a climate event. And we’re in the inside trying to 
negotiate with employers and governments to re-
ally get something through that would improve the 
well-being of workers and their families. The labour 
movement sees the power of being in both places, 
and I do think there is intentional coordination 
with civil society organisations. We can’t do this 
alone and building coalitions across movements is 
critical to advancing a transformative agenda.
Something I’ve learned through experience is that 
refusal from the outset is a bad strategy. I’ll use the 
trade discussions, in which I’ve been emersed for 
many years, as an example. If you say no before you 
reach a table to see what a document looks like or 
what you might be able to do, then you really cede 
a lot of space. If the moment they announce a trade 
agreement you shout, ‘No! We hate it because it’s part 
of the neoliberal system, and so we’re just going to 
hate it,’ you have ceded whatever space you had to 
be listened to. You need to always stay grounded on 
the members and values that we represent. We often 
end up having to oppose agreements like the Trans 
Pacific Partnership and other trade agreements but 
that is after we put forward our proposals.
Sometimes that may be necessary if it’s just a horri-
ble, horrible proposal. But most of the time I would 
say that you forfeit your ability to have any role in 
shaping things if you don’t maintain a strategic in-
sider-outsider approach.
The current set of crises – the pandemic, growing 
economic, racial, and gender inequality, climate 
change, attacks on democracy, etc. – provide an 
important opportunity for movements to not only 
critique the current system but to put forward bold 
and transformative ideas. We need to make sure 
that as we emerge from these crises that we are not 
going back to a past model but rather building to-
wards a new social contract that puts the well-being 
of workers and the environment at its core.
Neil: How do you apply that general lesson to the 
field of trafficking and modern slavery, and specif-
ically to the Palermo Protocol on trafficking? One 
outsider critique of these concepts is that they ex-
clusively focus attention on the worst of the worst. 
And, as those concepts have become dominant, they 
have drawn attention away from widespread forms 
of everyday exploitation. They have caused us to not 
only forget about everyday forms of inequality but to 
naturalise them by focusing on the extremes. What’s 
your response to that critique?
Cathy:  Workplace exploitation is a continuum, 
right? Just look at what’s happening in the Uyghur 
region of China – the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) – where the Chinese government 
runs a massive programme to detain and persecute 
well over 1 million Uyghurs and other Muslims and 
Turkic language speakers. Aside from running the 
largest internment and forced labor programme of 
an ethnic and religious group since the Holocaust, 
China has broadly deployed state-of-the-art surveil-
lance hardware and artificial intelligence software 
to monitor the lives of workers and their families. 
This benefits more than just the Chinese govern-
ment and its state-owned enterprises. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) from around the world profit 
greatly from the forced labour in this region and are 
reluctant to respond to the Coalition to End Forced 
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Labour in the Uyghur Region’s call to action that de-
mands that they leave the region and end the use of 
forced labor in their supply chains.
The system of repression and forced labour and the 
complicity of major multinational brands stems 
from the same set of economic policies that allows 
labour to be exploited in the first place. What I’ve 
found in the trafficking and modern-day slavery 
space is there’s not much critique of the actual eco-
nomic system that allows this to happen. There’s lit-
tle critique of the relationship between labour and 
capital. And, I would say, it’s not surprising when 
you look at the roots of the human rights move-
ment. The human rights movement was meant to 
soften the economic model rather than overthrow 
it. It was meant to be a Band-Aid on it, something 
that makes it a little bit better.
In the US context, a lot of the anti-trafficking 
money in recent years has come from foundations 
that got their start with major funding from Sili-
con Valley, which historically has been anti-union. 
The major players in Silicon Valley want workers 
to remain flexible and want them to be independ-
ent contractors. The recent campaign in California 
over Proposition 22 shows the amount of resources 
that many Silicon Valley companies are willing to 
invest to ensure that labour stays cheap and flexi-
ble. Companies like Doordash, Instacart, Uber and 
Lyft spent close to $200 million to put this propo-
sition on California’s ballot in the recent Novem-
ber 2020 elections. It was the most expensive ballot 
measures in US history, and was written by com-
panies seeking to increase their profits by denying 
workers the right to paid sick leave, a minimum 
wage, and basic safety protections. They apply this 
same model throughout their supply chains, where 
they intentionally distance themselves from tak-
ing responsibility for the workers who produce for 
them. So many of these companies weaken labour 
regulations while at the same time saying they want 
to eradicate slavery because it’s so horrible. They 
fail to see that they are shaping rules of the econo-
my that lead to labour exploitation.
Neil: So why is Silicon Valley pumping money into 
slavery and trafficking specifically, do you think?
Cathy:  Because it’s something that most people can 
get behind from a moral standpoint. You can back it 
without having to critique the system. And, even in a 
moment of real tension in the United States, it’s one of 
these issues that continues to have bipartisan support.
Talking about people being enslaved is a way of 
building and channelling basic moral outrage. 
Rich people do not want you to have moral outrage 
about the economic model that they’re profiting 
from. They want a complete disconnect. They want 
you to believe that the reason there is modern-day 
slavery has nothing to do with the way the rules are 
shaped in the global economy.
That’s been one of the challenges for the anti-traffick-
ing movement. There are exceptions – there are some 
fantastic groups doing really important work – but 
most don’t come out with a huge critique of the neo-
liberal model, right? It’s about freeing the slaves, that 
whole framework. But if you free a group of slaves 
and don’t change the system that allows people to be 
slaves, you’re not addressing the systemic problem.
“If you free a group of slaves and don’t change the system that allows 
people to be slaves, you’re not addressing the systemic problem.”
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Neil: So in other words modern-day slavery is often 
being used as a fig leaf for distracting attention away 
from the structures underpinning all exploitation.
Cathy:  Correct. There are many reasons people 
get into this field. The labour movement believes 
that to really address forced labour and trafficking, 
strengthening workers’ rights must be part of the 
solution and workers must be part of shaping the 
needed policies and programmes. Some organisa-
tions working in the field definitely come from a 
faith-based perspective or a moral calling, and they 
do not see worker rights as a key issue. I believe 
many groups don’t want to address root causes. 
They instead want to frame it entirely from a moral 
standpoint and not engage in the needed work to 
transform a system that has produced enormous 
wealth and at the same time extreme exploitation.
I find it so interesting that the libertarian-leaning Sil-
icon Valley has been a major funder of modern-day 
slavery and anti-trafficking work. Remember when 
everybody was clapping their hands a few months 
ago about essential workers? At the same time there 
was huge opposition from the business community 
to a temporary emergency health and safety stand-
ard that would have helped keep people safe and 
healthy during the pandemic. Huge opposition. But 
these same people were taking out hundred-thou-
sand-dollar ads in the Washington Post saying we 
salute our frontline workers who are getting sick 
without supporting regulations to ensure worker 
safety during a pandemic. It’s rank hypocrisy.
The pandemic has also further exposed the lack of 
protection for migrant workers throughout global 
supply chains and in the care economy. Many of 
these same companies that fund anti-trafficking 
programmes also benefit from weak protections for 
migrant workers. The system of work visas, recruit-
ment fees, and the constant threat of deportation 
make migrant workers vulnerable to trafficking and 
forced labour.
To go even broader, it’s the same critique we have 
about traditional corporate social responsibility. 
CSR is not about systemic change. It’s about public 
relations and not about transforming the way you 
do business. That is why the labour movement sup-
ports models that are worker-driven and binding, 
that are shaped by workers, and that come with real 
consequences when there are violations.
Neil: Are we thus doing a disservice to progressive 
forces and to labour generally by using the terms 
forced labour, human trafficking, or modern-day 
slavery, given that they are so clearly exploited by 
the powerful to maintain the status quo?
Cathy: ‘Forced labour’ is a term that’s well defined, 
and its elimination is a fundamental principle of 
the ILO. It just says what it is: you’re forced to la-
bour. That’s clear. 
Now ‘modern slavery’, that’s a very problematic term. 
The United States is still grappling with slavery and 
what that has meant for our economic system. Our 
current system was built on exploitation of labour 
and particularly the labour of people of colour, who 
were enslaved. And you can see how our system 
continues to be built around that. So I’m not sure we 
need the word ‘modern-day’. I don’t know why we 
need to change that framework. We’re trying to take 
on an economic system that creates huge wealth and 
profit for a few through enslavement and exploita-
tion. There’s nothing modern about that.
The current debates in the United States are, in a very 
positive way, causing people to really look at what 
it has meant that this country’s system is built off 
the enslavement of people of colour. That’s the oth-
er piece that I never hear from the trafficking and 
modern-day slavery movement. Perhaps I’m just not 
in the right rooms for these conversations, but we 
don’t hear about the intersection with race in all of 
this. You can see this clearly in Mauritania or around 
ethnicity in the Uyghur region in China. You have to 
create a construct of others to justify subjecting them 
to the most severe forms of exploitation in your sys-
tem. There’s nothing modern about that.
So I’ve never quite understood why ‘modern-day’ 
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has been added to ‘slavery’. We’ve had this neolib-
eral model for over 40 years, and within the con-
text of that model it was framed as modern. But we 
know that the whole system is built on that.
Neil: That’s actually one reason for pause around 
the definition of forced labour. It’s a clear enough 
idea, but the definition is inherently individualis-
ing. It’s about interpersonal coercion, not the struc-
tural coercion inherent to capitalism and market 
life. This individual focus hides why some people 
have no other option but to take bad and exploit-
ative work.
Cathy:  There are of course individual power dy-
namics involved in certain instances, but it all 
comes back to a system. Again, I’m focused these 
days on working with a global coalition to elimi-
nate forced labour in the Uyghur region of China. 
We knew from the beginning of the campaign that 
we would need to move beyond a campaign of mor-
al shaming to one focused on ending the economic 
structures supporting forced labour. Sometimes 
people ask why we’re doing a corporate campaign 
around this. Well, it’s because we are trying to undo 
the ways that corporations benefit from a system of 
forced labour in that region.
The labour movement approaches this as we do 
with everything, by looking at systems and the need 
for a collective response. You’re not going to ad-
dress forced labour by having individuals raise their 
hands and say, ‘please change my work conditions.’ 
We’ve never found that to be the way that you shape 
power relations. If trafficking affects some of the 
most vulnerable workers, including migrants, then 
you must look at programmes that support migrant 
worker organising and power building in migrant 
communities. So I understand the importance of 
that critique, but I’m not sure that’s how the labour 
movement has ever viewed it. The way we take on 
forced labour is from a systems approach and from 
a collective response.
Neil: We’ve reached the twentieth anniversary of 
the Palermo Protocol on trafficking. What’s your 
take? Has it been a success? Or has it caused more 
trouble than it is worth?
Cathy:  Whenever you have one of these anniver-
saries, I think it’s important to pause and remind 
yourself that all these pieces of global architecture 
are flawed. They’re imperfect. They have been put 
through a tripartite or multilateral set of negotia-
tions, and they’ve come out very watered down. So 
the real question we as movement should be asking 
is, ‘were we able to use the focus on this piece of 
global architecture to build effective movements?’
I’m less interested in the UN meetings of people 
flitting around and talking about it. I want to know 
if we used that global architecture to fuel effective 
global movements to end trafficking and to end the 
systems that allow trafficking and forced labour to 
occur. And if you ask that question, I would say 
we’re not there yet.
The way supply chains have been built allows pre-
carious workers to have work one day and no work 
the next. Some of what goes on in the Uyghur re-
gion is simply astonishing. Our clothes and tech-
nology have been made with forced labour and all 
I hear are companies telling me, ‘well, you don’t 
know how complicated it is to leave China.’
We have not yet used Palermo to build effective 
movements to transform the system that allows this 
type of extreme labour exploitation to occur. And so 
we need to ask ourselves, in this current moment, is 
that a tool that is still effective? Is there something 
more that we need? I would say that if your move-
ment does not have an analysis of power, and does 
not have an analysis of the intersection of how power 
works and of changing the economic system, then 
your movement does not have the elements it needs 
to carry out what was in the spirit of Palermo.
This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.
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After two decades as an anti-trafficker, two things 
are clear to me. First, there are no magic bullets for 
success in anti-trafficking. Preventing and combat-
ting trafficking in human beings requires knowl-
edge of the patterns, factors, and circumstances that 
allow trafficking to happen. Second, there are no 
purely technical solutions. Anti-trafficking efforts 
are political in nature, and political responses are 
required to protect people and provide effective as-
sistance to victims.
Governments bear primary responsibility for this 
and it is their job to ensure that they comply with 
their international obligations. They must, for ex-
ample, ensure that victims are not subject to crimi-
nal sanctions. They must also refrain from expelling 
potential victims due to their unlawful migration or 
labour status. This is all already stipulated in inter-
national agreements; what is needed is the political 
will to put those into practice.
It has been twenty years since the Palermo Protocol 
came into force. Over that time anti-traffickers have 
participated in endless negotiations around docu-
ments and declarations, in conferences, seminars, 
workshops, and trainings. Despite this, trafficking 
has persisted, as have questions as to whether and 
when governments will ever muster up that politi-
cal will. How successful can we have been as a field?
Frankly, I am unsure. My experience tells me that ac-
tion is still often taken simply for the sake of action, 
which neither leads to nor produces meaningful re-
sults. Too much effort has been spent on symptoms, 
while too little has substantively addressed causes. 
We have not yet moved away from the cookie-cutter 
approach to policy. And still there is no integration 
between anti-trafficking and more significant areas 
of policymaking, such as development cooperation, 
technology transfers, trade, and investment. Would 
it be better just to call the anti-trafficking field an 
anti-trafficking industry?
Worse, the partnerships which are often vaunted in 
this world are frequently superficial.
Partnership, in general, means cooperation and coor-
dination between equals based on mutual trust. Part-
nerships should be mutually beneficial and oriented 
towards the same goal: the eradication or decrease of 
trafficking and the prioritisation of survival, wellbe-
ing, and freedom. However, in most cases, funding is 
provided by destination countries that typically sup-
press cross-border migration. Their funds strongly 
influence the anti-trafficking agenda and define its 
scope. This has meant stepping up border controls 
and subordinating human rights protections, there-
by undermining the protection of victims.
Anti-trafficking programmes should be seen as com-
ponents of sustainable development, anti-discrimi-
nation, and anti-violence work. They should support 
the development of long-term, comprehensive strat-
egies and seek long-term solutions. The fundamental 
problem is that they do not. Money has increasingly 
shifted attention away from issues of development, 
equality, and human rights to issues of state security 
and migration. It is high time for all of us, but espe-
cially for governments and government officials, to 
understand trafficking from the perspective of hu-
man rights and development.
It is also vital that we develop greater accountability. 
This applies both to governments and to large in-
stitutional actors like UN agencies, since they play 
a huge role in decisions over how resources are al-
Is human trafficking truly an intractable problem?
Helga Konrad
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located. Despite this, they know surprisingly little 
about the impact of their anti-trafficking activities 
on trafficked persons, vulnerable groups, or on so-
cieties in general.
Both governments and anti-trafficking institutions 
are wary of these kinds of evaluations because 
they worry that they might reveal that money has 
been wasted, or even that measures have proved 
harmful. This is a problem. Evaluation should be 
an integral part of all anti-trafficking work. In the 
long run, governments, institutions, and societies 
at large will benefit from systematic impact assess-
ments, because they will help prevent pouring good 
money after bad.
If we want things to change in this field, we need less 
rhetoric and greater focus on concrete implementa-
tion in the service of human rights. Less lip-service 
and more coherent policy informed by expertise 
and experience. We need a culture of effective and 
open evaluation; it is high time for a new genera-
tion of progress assessments and reports.
Above all, governments need not simply to control 
migration and prostitution, but to adopt diverse, 
long-term policies and strategies in dealing with 
unemployment and labour migration. They need to 
develop strategies other than trying to get rid of vic-
tims of trafficking as quickly as possible – strategies 
such as joint programmes of (re-)integration and 
more socially-balanced economic programmes. In 
the end, we have no alternative but to engage with 
the root causes of human trafficking, no matter 
how complex, difficult, and forbidding they may be. 
In our fight against trafficking in human beings we 
must put an end to the complicity of silence, to the 
complicity of indifference. We must ask ourselves 
what we have really achieved as a field and what we 
need to change.
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What is the best way to achieve meaningful change 
and advance social justice? Is it working for govern-
ments, where power is concentrated? Or in cam-
paigning organisations, which can leverage popular 
pressure? What of the media, where your reach is 
wide? Or academia, where you can speak truth to 
power? These are hotly debated questions and sim-
ple answers are hard to come by. Each has its merits, 
and most have their drawbacks.
I have been a professional campaigner for a long 
time. I currently work for WeMove Europe, which 
seeks to build people power to transform Europe for 
future generations and our planet. Prior to that I was 
campaigns director for Walk Free – the ‘movement 
to end modern slavery’, an influential player in the 
anti-slavery field. In this piece, I aim to reflect on cer-
tain key, behind-the-scenes considerations under-
pinning strategic choices for organisations like those 
I have worked for, which attempt to harness people 
power via online mobilisation and offline organising. 
I want to be open about what we do and why, so as to 
contribute to a wider conversation about how we and 
our allies might do things better.
Key questions for digital campaigners
These are the questions we ask ourselves when con-
ceiving, planning, and managing campaigns.
1) What is ‘political’ for people?  What is in the 
media? What are people talking about in cafes and 
bars? These questions are vital for mass mobilisa-
tion campaigning organisations. People taking col-
lective action is where our power lies, and we know 
that people are more likely to take action when 
there is energy around an issue. This means that 
we have to feel the pulse of popular sentiment and 
adapt to it. For example, at WeMove we are current-
ly running a campaign in support of Unconditional 
Basic Income (UBI) – a regular income for every-
one regardless of how poor they are.
With the coronavirus pandemic and so many strug-
gling to make ends meet, this idea, which was once 
too radical to touch, has now become popular and 
suddenly people are interested. We can feel a pulse 
there and our campaign at WeMove seeks to quick-
en it. But that’s new. When I worked at Walk Free 
seven years ago, a researcher approached me about 
running a UBI campaign. I liked it and was sym-
pathetic, but at that time it wasn’t going to work 
because it just didn’t have the traction. Linking the 
campaigns we run to what has public traction puts 
constraints on what we are able to do.
2) What needs to change? When planning a cam-
paign, we have to ask ourselves, ‘will it challenge the 
system? Will it address the root causes of the prob-
lem?’ We ask ourselves, ‘how can we make sure that 
the campaigns we’re running don’t just lead to incre-
mental change within a system that isn’t working, 
or even worse, content ourselves with only stopping 
bad things from happening?’ What we want are cam-
paigns that address root causes, so we ask ourselves 
whether winning a particular campaign will be a 
stepping stone forwards or create a leverage point 
that will help us achieve bigger change.
The UBI example is again relevant here. As I see it, 
this campaign is for truly systemic change; it seeks 
to challenge the current capitalist system, inequali-
ty, and our relationship to work. UBI can help tack-
le poverty (and the severe exploitation that is relat-
ed to it) by removing many of the barriers to qualify 
for financial support. But it can also drive wellbeing 
by giving people the economic breathing space to 
People power to end exploitation?
Mika Leandro
◆ 38 ◆
further their education, volunteer locally, escape an 
abusive relationship, or just feel a little less anxious 
about the future.
But of course, not all campaigns are so clear cut and 
there’s often serious internal debate about whether 
a particular idea will get to the core of the issue or 
not. It’s hard to know if you’re on the right track 
because systemic change takes time. You don’t see 
impact immediately, you have to trust your gut, 
and you have to let go of your obsession with quick 
metrics. Mass mobilising around systemic change 
is also hard because the moments where public at-
tention makes mass mobilisation so effective rarely 
last. The news cycle moves on and momentum dies 
down, even though you’re nowhere near your goal 
yet. An organisation’s approach also depends on the 
perspectives and analyses of those in the room. At 
Walk Free, for example, the content and even mer-
its of systemic change were viewed differently to 
where I am right now.
3) What are the opportunities?  What can be 
changed in this present moment? How? And can 
mass action on the part of the community of peo-
ple we mobilise make a difference that contributes 
to it? These are central questions for campaigners, 
because if our actions can’t help bring about the 
change we desire then we are probably not the best 
placed to take on this particular challenge. People 
power is, after all, our added value. And the key 
thing to remember is that different historical mo-
ments present different opportunities for mobili-
sation and change. Right now, the pandemic has 
opened a space for profound change. Ideas that 
seemed impossible suddenly don’t seem so radical. 
We are at a unique point in history with a major 
crisis on our hands – that’s an opportunity to bring 
about progress.
Process and its pitfalls
People working in digital mass mobilisation organ-
isations like me get used to critics saying that peti-
tions don’t make a difference, or that the scale of the 
problem is insurmountable, or that campaigns sen-
sationalise and simplify complex issues. In doing 
what we do, there are a variety of steps we take that 
don’t always make sense when viewed in isolation 
so I’ll discuss some of them to make our tactical 
choices clearer.
1) ‘Petitions don’t make any real difference; they 
just make the people who sign them feel better’. It’s 
true that petitions on their own rarely make a differ-
ence: decision makers need to be on board to achieve 
change. They do have their uses though. Petitions 
can help build pressure to get a decision maker to 
change their position, or they can support a decision 
maker who has decided to do something but needs 
to show public backing for it. They are usually just 
one step in a wider campaign. In the end, they ‘work’ 
only when they are part of something broader, with 
allies and ordinary people putting pressure on deci-
sion makers in a variety of ways.
2) ‘The campaigns you run are too narrowly fo-
cused compared to the scale of the issue. You fo-
cus on one person, rather than on the system’. A 
good example of this was the campaign I worked on 
at Walk Free to free the anti-slavery activist Andy 
“Mass mobilising around systemic change is hard because the moments 
where public attention makes mass mobilisation so effective rarely last.”
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Hall. He had been sued by the Thai pineapple com-
pany Natural Fruit and arrested following his inves-
tigation into forced labour among migrant workers 
in Thailand in 2013. Our campaign was to get him 
released. But the idea wasn’t only to help him as an 
individual. Andy Hall could have simply evaded by 
exercising his privilege and returning to the UK, 
but his priority was to make a stand for migrant 
workers at whatever personal cost, and he stayed 
there for years fighting. We knew that telling a per-
sonal story which our supporters could relate to 
would allow us to tell a broader story that may not 
otherwise have been heard – in this case of forced 
labour in Thailand, which went on to become a ma-
jor international issue.
Of course, there are serious drawbacks to this ap-
proach. In this particular case, you have to ask 
whether it was the best idea to tell a story of a 
relatively wealthy white person to other relatively 
wealthy, mostly white people in the hopes of cat-
alysing action on an issue primarily affecting poor 
people of colour. We were arguably complicit in re-
inforcing orientalist ideas and I learned a lot from 
our decisions. Thankfully, more and more organi-
sations are reflecting seriously about what they de-
pict in their campaigns, why, and how.
3) ‘You sensationalise and over-simplify’.  Some-
times digital campaigning organisations act too 
fast; sometimes we test for content that inspires 
people and, in the process, use frames and narra-
tives that are problematic. You see this with ‘mod-
ern slavery’ and with many other issues. Our aim is 
to tell engaging stories that motivate people without 
reinforcing problematic messaging. That is a hard 
balance to strike and we don’t always get it right.
That doesn’t mean we’re not trying. During the 
campaign design process a team will have serious 
internal conversations about how to minimise the 
risks, they will have their content reviewed by ex-
perts, and try to find a framing and narrative that 
points towards systemic change. At WeMove, where 
we campaign on the EU level, we’re frequently told 
that we’re being overly complicated. We don’t try 
to excessively dumb down what is happening in 
Europe. We do try to relate it to people’s own ex-
periences. And we are very conscious of the need 
to shift narratives, because ultimately, she who con-
trols the narrative wins.
In the end, when I ask myself how we can best end 
exploitation, it is clear that people taking action to-
gether towards systemic change and changing the 
narrative is key. But there is no way we can achieve 
change in a silo. Truly meaningful change only 
happens when people mobilise, the media tells the 
story broadly and helps share the new narrative, 
academia proposes alternatives, and government 
listens and acts. Change is hard. That’s why it’s so 
important for different actors to understand each 
other better and work together. We are all part of 
the same ecosystem and right now, in this moment 
of history, we all need each other more than ever.
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Supply chains have been heavily criticised since the 
onset of COVID-19, as shortages of PPE and other 
medical equipment have laid bare the vulnerabili-
ties they create for consumers. But labour and hu-
man rights activists were raising the alarm over the 
dark side of supply chain capitalism well before the 
current crisis. In many industries, the global brands 
that sit atop these chains directly employ only a rel-
atively small number of workers. They depend on 
armies of contractors and subcontractors to actual-
ly produce the goods they sell or market. Typically 
smaller and less profitable than their clients, these 
suppliers compete for orders from lead firms and 
frequently, to win them, they must find ways to cut 
costs. Labour-related costs are almost always their 
first port of call. This, in a nutshell, is how supply 
chain capitalism exerts downward pressure on wag-
es and working conditions worldwide.
Recently, legal efforts to address this problem have 
focused on trying to influence lead firm behaviour. 
Both ‘hard law’ like the UK Modern Slavery Act and 
‘soft law’ projects like the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights rely on 
lead firm transparency and due diligence require-
ments to rein in the excesses of supply chain cap-
italism. Critics of this model frequently note that, 
beyond reporting, it imposes no substantive obliga-
tions on buyer firms. They are not required to im-
prove conditions for suppliers or the workers their 
suppliers employ. As such, transparency legislation 
is highly compatible with conventional corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) schemes, which rest on 
two core principles: voluntarism and unilateralism. 
Lead firms (or closely aligned third parties such as 
commercial auditors) decide what standards will 
be acceptable in their supply chains, when they are 
being met, and what happens if they are not. Often 
there are no consequences for suppliers that fail to 
comply with standards.
The Fair Food Program (FFP), created by the Coali-
tion of Immokalee Workers (CIW), represents a rad-
ically different approach to supply chain regulation. 
In our contribution to this series, we examine why 
the FFP works and how it differs from conventional 
CSR approaches. We also emphasise the conditions 
that have enabled the FFP not just to succeed, but to 
expand when so many other labour organisations re-
main on the defensive. We begin by explaining how 
the FFP grew out of anti-trafficking work in Florida’s 
tomato industry, and the realisation that a criminal 
justice approach to labour trafficking was never go-
ing to sufficiently address the root causes of the prob-
lem in agricultural supply chains.
Towards a root cause analysis
Until recently, Florida’s fresh tomato industry was a 
hotspot for labour trafficking. The civil rights divi-
sion of the United States Department of Justice de-
scribed the fields in central and southern Florida in 
the late 1990s as “ground zero for modern-day slav-
ery.” This is where, in 1993, the group that would 
become the CIW began to organise farmworkers. 
In addition to low (and declining) wages, health 
and safety hazards, and verbal and physical abuse, 
the CIW shone a spotlight on forced labour in the 
fields. They also pushed for the passage of the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000. 
Once the TVPA was enacted, CIW cooperated in 
a series of successful forced labour cases, providing 
critical assistance to government investigators.
While these victories were widely celebrated at the 
time, they also pointed to a deeper challenge: the 
fact that serial prosecutions were necessary sug-
The art of using supply chains to defend workers’ rights
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gested that the TVPA was not deterring would-be 
traffickers. Preventing crimes from taking place is 
always preferable to intervening once injustice has 
already occurred, and it requires a focus on root 
causes – in this case, the structural conditions that 
enable forced labour in the fields.
Prominent among these is the pervasive use of farm 
labour contracting (FLC). Under the FLC system, 
contractors, known in the industry as crewleaders, 
provide labour for growers by recruiting and man-
aging crews of workers. This creates fertile condi-
tions for crewleaders to exploit the workers they 
recruit, with abuses ranging from wage theft to, in 
extreme cases, forced labour. These problems per-
sist because other actors in the supply chain tend 
to assign sole responsibility for them to the con-
tractor. Both farmers and consumers can claim that 
they have no way of knowing if workers are being 
trafficked or otherwise abused by the crewleaders 
contracted to harvest crops.
As we learned from our research on agricultural 
supply chains, outsourcing via the FLC system has 
long been central to the labour process in commer-
cial farming, and the problems associated with it are 
widely known. One US official whom we interviewed 
emphasised that the FLC system “allows [growers] to 
close their eyes and not really see what is going on 
with those workers; they feel shielded from the prob-
lems of wage theft, substandard housing, and other 
responsibilities. And if they see awful things, they 
can say that they aren’t responsible.” The question for 
CIW was how to eliminate the plausible deniability 
of actors higher up the chain; in other words, they 
needed to create a way to close the accountability 
loophole in the supply chain.
Leveraging supply chains to empower workers
In order to achieve meaningful change for farm-
workers, CIW decided to leverage the dynamics 
of the supply chain. Instead of targeting individual 
farms that grow tomatoes, CIW decided to focus on 
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the small and highly concentrated set of powerful 
buyers that purchase the bulk of fresh tomatoes from 
Florida suppliers: retailers, food service companies, 
and restaurant chains. As large, visible corporations 
with names well known to consumers, the compa-
nies purchasing tomatoes made better targets for 
consumer-driven activism,  like boycotts and stu-
dent-led campaigns, than the farms themselves.
Building a broad alliance of workers, student and 
faith groups, and other allies, the CIW successfully 
orchestrated boycotts of fast food companies and 
grocery chains in order to pressure buyers to sit 
down and negotiate with CIW. Four years after the 
launch of the Fair Food Campaign, this strategy fi-
nally bore fruit: Taco Bell’s parent company, Yum 
Foods, signed the first enforceable agreement with 
CIW, committing it to buy Florida-grown tomatoes 
only from farms that comply with the  Fair Food 
Code of Conduct, a rigorous set of labour standards 
designed by the CIW with extensive worker input.
With the first buyer agreement executed, the CIW’s 
Fair Food Campaign continued to pressure others to 
join suit and one by one they did. The Fair Food Pro-
gram (FFP) went into full effect in Florida’s tomato 
fields in 2011, after reaching a critical mass of sig-
natory buyers and growers. Under the programme, 
farms that do not comply with the Fair Food Code 
of Conduct face an escalating series of sanctions, in-
cluding a suspension of all tomato purchases from 
participating buyers. There are a few ‘zero toler-
ance’  provisions in the code that merit automatic 
suspension, one of which is forced labour.
The code also requires all growers participating 
in the FFP to hire and pay farmworkers directly. 
Crewleaders continue to operate on farms as su-
pervisors, but they are no longer the employers of 
those they supervise as is the case under the FLC 
system. Instead, workers are employed by the grow-
er, who issues each worker a pay cheque in their 
name – a practice that dramatically reduces the 
scope for trafficking in the tomato supply chain and 
ensures that growers are held accountable for any 
abusive practices that occur.
Compliance with the direct hire requirement, like 
the other elements of the code, is overseen and en-
forced by the Fair Food Standards Council (FFSC), 
the Fair Food Program’s monitoring arm. In addi-
tion to conducting yearly audits, which include ex-
tensive worker interviews on all participating farms, 
FFSC staff also run a 24-hour helpline that workers 
can use to report suspected code violations. FFSC re-
ports indicate that, to date, auditors have conducted 
more than 26,000 worker interviews over the course 
of 264 audits; drafted and supervised the implemen-
tation of 189 corrective action plans for participat-
ing growers; and fielded over 1,800 complaints from 
workers via the helpline. The CIW, meanwhile, con-
ducts education sessions on all participating farms 
so that workers know about their rights and respon-
sibilities under the Fair Food Program.
While tomatoes continue to be the programme’s core 
crop, the FFP has expanded to include both new 
crops (primarily bell peppers and strawberries) and 
new buyers, including  Walmart, which joined in 
2014. It now includes participating growers in eight 
states stretching from Florida to New Jersey. Taken 
together, these efforts constitute one of the most rig-
orous labour rights monitoring and enforcement ef-
forts in the history of American agriculture.
Learning from successful regulation
The FFP model works largely because it differs 
from conventional CSR in two ways. First, the FFP 
is not a unilateral, business-led initiative designed 
and overseen by industry actors. Farmworkers, as 
represented by CIW, are parties to the Fair Food 
Agreements. The Fair Food Code of Conduct re-
flects their experiences, and they play an active and 
ongoing role in enforcing the code through their 
participation in audits and their use of the help-
line. Second, the FFP departs from the voluntarism 
of the traditional CSR model. When buyers sign 
Fair Food Agreements they make binding com-
mitments that are enforceable, when necessary, by 
arbitration. Similarly, the FFP uses market conse-
quences to enforce the obligations of growers; in 
other words, buyers are prohibited from purchas-
ing from non-compliant suppliers.
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Can this model be replicated? The  worker-driven 
social responsibility model created by FFP has been 
replicated successfully both in the United States, 
in  the dairy sector, and abroad, including a new 
agreement to address  gender-based harassment 
and violence in Lesotho. Other campaigns are on-
going in a variety of sectors around the world, in-
cluding the US construction industry.  So, the real 
question is,  what are the conditions under which 
this model can be replicated?
To answer this query, we need to identify the mod-
el’s elements. The Fair Food Program grew out of 
organising efforts that, over time, gave CIW inti-
mate knowledge of supply chain dynamics and an 
understanding of the issues confronting the mi-
grant worker community. Beyond its roots in the 
CIW’s work, the creation and expansion of the FFP 
rests, ultimately, on the willingness of consumers to 
put pressure on lead firms and on the susceptibili-
ty of corporate targets to this kind of mobilisation. 
In addition to consumer-facing brands, unequal 
bargaining power is another critical element of 
this supply chain model. CIW recognised that lead 
firms can use their weight to require suppliers to 
meet labour standards, just as they require them 
to meet quality standards or price specifications. 
Lead firms are also the supply chain actors best 
positioned to absorb the higher costs associated 
with better standards; in the case of the FFP, this 
includes a “penny per pound” premium that signa-
tory buyers pay to augment workers’ wages. More 
symmetrical supply chains may offer fewer oppor-
tunities to leverage lead firm power into improve-
ments for workers. Finally, the FFP is supported by 
a legal system that includes both state and federal 
labour regulations (even if poorly enforced) and a 
functioning judicial regime capable of upholding 
the Fair Food Agreements in the event of a dispute. 
Sustaining supply chain labour agreements where 
these elements are absent will be more challeng-
ing, as developments regarding the Bangladesh Ac-
cord on Fire and Building Safety suggest.
While these caveats make clear that there are limits 
to this model’s replicability, worker-centred supply 
chain regulation may be possible in contexts that 
share these conditions: the presence of an organi-
sation with the knowledge and legitimacy to repre-
sent workers, and the existence of one or more lead 
firms with sufficient market power over suppliers 
and recognisable brands vulnerable to consumer 
pressure. Where these elements are present, supply 
chains might represent opportunity structures that 
can be mobilised to workers’ benefit.
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The Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women 
(GAATW) has been working on issues associated 
with human trafficking since 1994. While trafficking 
has always been a core component of our work, we 
are well aware of the negative and counter-produc-
tive effects that anti-trafficking interventions fre-
quently produce. And these effects have caused us 
to question whether it is better strategically to be on 
the  inside, outside or somewhere in between – the 
main thematic focus of this feature – many times.
GAATW’s members made this a key question at our 
tenth anniversary meeting in 2004. This was a major 
event in the history of our organisation, with more 
than 200 participants from 42 countries around the 
world. We welcomed representatives from our mem-
ber and partner organisations, some of our donors, 
organised sex workers and domestic workers, aca-
demics, colleagues from the UN including the first 
special rapporteur on trafficking, and individual ex-
perts who had worked with GAATW since its incep-
tion. It was a forum for honest discussion, respectful 
debate, and strategic planning for the alliance.
We knew that it would not be easy to arrive at a 
consensus in such a diverse gathering. However, 
we were not prepared for the divide which emerged 
amongst people who otherwise agreed with each 
other on many core issues. Colleagues were in 
solidarity with sex workers and working-class mi-
grants. They were worried that the anti-trafficking 
framework was being used to violate the rights of 
migrants and sex workers. They agreed that policies 
should be based on evidence. They were unanimous 
in their position that states must move away from a 
protectionist approach towards women that curtails 
their right to mobility and self-determination and 
focus on protecting their rights instead.
The main source of division was over the degree 
to which anti-trafficking could be held responsible 
for abuses against workers and migrants. Everyone 
accepted that there were problems which pre-dated 
the rise of anti-trafficking, but opinion remained 
strongly divided over whether or not anti-traffick-
ing was making things worse or better. It also be-
came clear that these differences of opinion were 
partly tied to differences in position. Colleagues 
who worked with trafficked persons on a daily ba-
sis favoured a different approach to researchers and 
analysts. Some friends championed the need for a 
It isn’t just anti-trafficking: we must always ask whose 
interests we really serve
Bandana Pattanaik
“It is one thing to draw attention to problems and silences. It is quite 
another to get states and corporations to change course.”
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‘paradigm shift’ and for ‘jettisoning the framework’. 
Others worried that their hard work with trafficked 
persons was being completely dismissed by those 
who do not have ‘grassroots’ experience.
Building beyond silos
There were major practical consequences to this de-
bate, since the future strategic direction of the alli-
ance would look very different depending on which 
viewpoint was favoured. After much deliberation 
it was decided that GAATW would adopt a two-
pronged strategy. One prong would critically engage 
with the anti-trafficking framework by documenting 
the human rights violations caused by specific ini-
tiatives. It would also facilitate processes of critical 
reflection among our members, drawing upon their 
own experiences and circumstances. The second 
prong, meanwhile, would step up engagement with 
migrant workers and women in low wage work, 
thereby taking up a much broader range of issues 
than those associated with anti-trafficking. GAATW 
had been founded as a feminist alliance in solidari-
ty with sex workers and all working-class migrants. 
So this seemed like a logical strategic direction as we 
moved into our second decade of work.
We have continued to deepen this strategy in the 
years since. We have repeatedly  documented the 
negative impact of anti-trafficking initiatives, such 
as stringent border controls, the criminalisation 
of migrants, and violence against sex workers. We 
have drawn attention to  excessive and misplaced 
spending on anti-trafficking, and the ways in which 
a crime-control framework provides a smoke-
screen for states to ignore the link between their 
policies and the precarity of millions of workers. 
We have also continued to work closely with sex 
workers, domestic workers, garment sector work-
ers, home-based workers, and women farmers, and 
have sought to build spaces for  inter-movement 
and inter-sectoral dialogues within civil society for 
mutual learning. This has meant a sustained effort 
to  reach outside silos  and build larger conversa-
tions and connections.
So have we been on the inside or outside? Perhaps 
we have tried to be critical insiders. As an alliance 
that emerged out of women’s rights movements, 
we have always focused on the challenges work-
ing-class women face while trying to exercise their 
rights to mobility and decent work. This in turn 
informed how we approached human trafficking. 
Trafficking, as we understood it, was a bad out-
come caused by restrictive migration regimes and 
a lack of rights and protection while working. We 
engaged in the advocacy around the Palermo Pro-
tocol, where we underscored the need for human 
rights protections of trafficked persons. However, 
we do not see any reason to applaud ‘the anti-traf-
ficking industrial complex’, and we definitely never 
saw our role as being amplifiers of – or cheerleaders 
for – the anti-trafficking framework.
Changing course is easier said than done
This does not mean, however, that we have solved 
these strategic dilemmas. Many challenges need to 
be overcome in order to effectively address exploita-
tion in the context of migration and labour, and we 
cannot help but worry about the limited impact that 
we have had. While we desperately try to hold on to 
our optimism, it is clear that systemic change will 
not happen any time soon. It is one thing to draw 
attention to problems and silences. It is quite another 
to get states and corporations to change course.
The challenges associated with the excesses of an-
ti-trafficking measures have only grown stronger in 
the years that have followed our 2004 meeting. We 
now have a substantial evidence base showing that 
current anti-trafficking initiatives will not stop traf-
ficking. We do not have to look too far to see that 
precarity and everyday abuses are the norm rath-
er than the exception. COVID-19 has shown very 
clearly that fundamental policy shifts are needed to 
address the multiple rights violations that millions 
of people experience.
Yet, we have not seen policymakers coming to-
gether to discuss these issues. Some countries have 
even taken steps to erode labour rights further over 
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the last few months. Migrants who were forced to 
return home in the early months of the pandem-
ic are now returning to work. When they resume 
work they will do so under the same or worse con-
ditions. Those unable to return face hunger and 
deprivation. The anti-trafficking framework  is in-
adequate to respond to their needs.
We also cannot ignore the fact that right-wing, 
authoritarian leaders enjoy a large support base in 
many parts of the world. Much stronger resistance 
to the current system is needed. But where will 
resistance to the current development paradigm 
start? How will it gather momentum? Will we in 
the NGO sector be able to lead the resistance? Or at 
least play a supportive role in it?
NGO coaptation and social justice
Those of us who are in the organised and funded 
NGO sector sometimes tend to overlook the fact 
that there are many social justice movements out-
side of our sector. Many of these movements are 
small and operate within specific local contexts. 
Several of them choose to retain their independ-
ence and autonomy by not taking funds from do-
nors. Some of them are  self-organised groups  of 
workers who support each other and resist abuse. It 
is important to acknowledge that while we are busy 
managing our projects and advancing our rights-
based agendas, we sometimes lose the ability to 
hear voices of people who do not fit into our frame-
work of analysis. Anti-trafficking activism is full of 
these oversights. While trying to identify trafficked 
persons all too often we ignore the fact that the so-
called trafficking victim’s self-definition might be 
very different from ours.
While NGOs have proliferated over the last two dec-
ades, the gap between local social justice movements 
and NGOs has also widened during this period. Many 
NGOs now focus exclusively on providing services to 
groups of disadvantaged or abused people who are 
neglected by the state. They provide essential services 
where the state does not, often with funding support 
from foreign donors, at the same time as these states 
further policies of exclusion and repression. Many 
NGOs therefore end up tacitly supporting, rather than 
effectively challenging, the still rising global tide of ne-
oliberalism and authoritarianism.
Some NGOs have made a strategic choice not to 
critique the state for fear of repression or co-option. 
However, opportunities to develop oppositional and 
people-centred politics within the NGO space have 
also shrunk. Community-based groups and small 
NGOs can be very precarious, and their survival 
increasingly depends on their capacity to execute 
projects which have been designed elsewhere. These 
projects tend to be conceptualised in ways which 
leave no space for the political education of the im-
plementing team and no time to listen to the ques-
tions and analyses of community workers. Larger 
NGOs such as GAATW are increasingly obliged to 
mimic this managerial model in order to prove our 
efficiency. In the process, valuable opportunities for 
local and experiential knowledge production, rig-
orous social analysis, and collaborative movement 
building are lost. The mind-boggling challenges 
around us are artificially contained within the frame 
of victim assistance and project management.
This dilemma is not specific to anti-trafficking work, 
but applies to the NGO sector more broadly. Once 
you are inside a frame – that you may not have creat-
ed or labelled – your main task is to oil it and keep it 
alive. Perhaps we should instead steal a little time to 
ask ourselves, on whose side are we and in whose in-
terests are we working? If we think we are on the side 
of working people, then we need to start walking the 
long and difficult road with them.
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Neil Howard (BTS): Helmut, you have nearly two 
decades of experience as both an anti-trafficker and 
a scholar of anti-trafficking. What’s your take on 
where the field is at?
Helmut Sax: The ultimate goal of anti-trafficking is 
not the prevention of trafficking, but the prevention 
of exploitation. Conceptually, trafficking should be 
regarded as no more than a preparatory act, some-
thing that creates or maintains situations of depend-
ency which make people vulnerable to being exploit-
ed. The added value of making trafficking a criminal 
offence is precisely that it enables us to address these 
situations – what I call the ‘logistics’ of dependency. 
But doing so means working much more closely with 
wider efforts to end exploitation. For example, when 
it comes to supply chains, we shouldn’t just be focus-
sing on monitoring but instead need to address poor 
working conditions, weak labour rights, and all the 
underlying cause factors that lead to a need for mon-
itoring in the first place.
Neil: So why is that not happening?
Helmut: Ironically, it’s partly attributable to the fact 
that, as a criminal offence, trafficking is typically 
addressed through the criminal justice system. This 
leads to a heavy emphasis on investigation, arrest, 
and prosecution, with the obvious consequence 
that individual criminals are targeted instead of the 
exploitative circumstances in which they operate. 
In practice, this sees states work hard to increase 
their numbers of trafficking investigations and con-
victions, but their actual focus really should be on 
addressing exploitation.
Neil: Indeed. I know that much of your work has 
focussed on children and their rights, so I’d like to 
ask you to explain the particular place that children 
have in the anti-trafficking universe.
Helmut:  The trafficking definition has completely 
failed in relation to children. The three elements of 
the general definition (‘recruitment’, ‘means’, ‘for the 
purposes of exploitation’) only make sense when 
considered together. However, with their problem-
atic understanding of childhood, the drafters of 
the Palermo Protocol decided to skip the ‘means’ 
element as a requirement for establishing traffick-
ing among children. As a result, in principle, any 
recruitment or transportation of children with the 
mere intention of exploiting them legally consti-
tutes child trafficking. This means that basically all 
child labour situations, even those where parents 
have put their children to work, would equate to 
‘trafficking’ – which includes dozens of millions of 
cases worldwide! This is of course both meaningless 
and impractical.
In addition, there is another issue here concerning 
the relationship between child trafficking and the 
‘sale of children’. At around the time that the Paler-
mo Protocol was being drafted, lawmakers were 
also working on an Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornog-
raphy (OPSC). And given how closely related these 
documents were, insufficient attention was given to 
the complementarity between them.
The OPSC addresses situations of sexual exploita-
tion of children. It focuses on ownership-like con-
trol by adults for remuneration, which may include 
situations of child abuse shared as pictures or video 
clips, illegal practices in the context of child adop-
tion, and prostitution. Clearly, there are overlaps 
INTERVIEW
Some observations on the anti-trafficking field
Helmut Sax with Neil Howard
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between these situations and those typically dis-
cussed in a trafficking context. Yet the conceptual 
starting points for the sale of children and child 
trafficking are different. Child trafficking aims at 
the exploitation of the services of the child, while 
the sale of children focusses rather on the transfer 
of control for remuneration, irrespective of what 
happens next to the child. Not every case of illegal 
child adoption, for example, is a child trafficking 
case, but the ‘sale’ of a child (however problemat-
ic that term) may be one of the ‘means’ used in a 
child trafficking case. In practice, there is often con-
fusion about these concepts, especially in relation 
to adoption and more recently also in discussions 
about surrogacy.
Neil: Complicated and challenging stuff. But, with-
out wishing to trivialise, surely from a victim per-
spective this is splitting hairs?
Helmut: Sure, from a ‘victim’ perspective, all such 
narrow categorisation is irrelevant. And it would be 
unnecessary if we were to follow a comprehensive, 
human rights-based approach to organising our 
societies. We’d all enjoy the rights to life, integrity, 
liberty, adequate standards of living, health, educa-
tion, work, and so on. In fact, in many respects this 
is the key issue – anti-trafficking has to a large ex-
tent focused only on the perpetrator side of things 
due to the initial framing of trafficking as a criminal 
offence. Perhaps the biggest challenge for discourse 
and practice is therefore (still!) the turnaround to 
adopt a more holistic rights-based approach.
In my view, if we are to achieve that, it could be help-
ful to look at the related issue of domestic violence. 
Over the last decades, huge progress has been made 
globally in establishing violence against women and 
children as issues that are not solely the concern of 
the private sphere. They are in fact matters of state 
concern and responsibility, with clear human rights 
obligations to protect victims, prevent abuse, inves-
tigate and provide redress. Although the situation 
is still far from ideal, public and political discourse 
has shifted significantly. That leads me to ask what 
lessons the anti-trafficking field can learn from that 
shift. How can we be sure that trafficking is seen as a 
structural issue, one that is really about exploitation? 
And how can we be sure that people recognise the 
ubiquity of this exploitation in the way we now do 
with domestic violence?
This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.
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On 15 July 2020, the United Nations special rap-
porteur on trafficking in persons delivered her an-
nual report to the UN Human Rights Council. Her 
report  amplified numerous other calls for a shift 
in focus away from law enforcement and towards 
human rights and the protection of victims. More 
strikingly, her report also noted that a new interna-
tional instrument may be required, since the Paler-
mo protocol may not be sufficient or effective when 
it comes to realising these human rights goals. 
While this call is still presented in diplomatic lan-
guage it isn’t that hard to read between the lines: the 
current anti-trafficking system isn’t working.
This piece takes this welcome intervention as its point 
of departure. It suggests that the Palermo protocol is 
irredeemably compromised and must be dismantled, 
rather than reformed. We instead need to strength-
en existing international instruments focusing upon 
workers’ and migrants’ rights and protections. Any 
new instrument which is developed needs to avoid 
the trap of making crime fighting a primary goal.
Since its adoption in November 2000, the Palermo 
protocol has attracted widespread support. It has 
received an impressive number of ratifications by 
UN member states, provided a foundation for in-
numerable national and international NGOs, and 
helped to place ‘human trafficking’ at the centre of 
political conversations across the globe. It has been 
described by Stephen Biegun, the US deputy secre-
tary of state, as proof of the tremendous achieve-
ments that can be realised when the international 
community comes together to combat human 
rights abuses and promote the rule of law.
Supporters of the protocol acknowledge that it has 
imperfections and limitations, but passionately 
counter that any problems are outweighed by both 
its current contributions and, crucially, future poten-
tial. Despite the fact that it has now been around for 
two decades, supporters continue to maintain that 
any flaws should be regarded as ‘blips’ or ‘teething 
issues’. Instead of being treated as signs of failure, or 
as evidence of the need for a course correction, prob-
lems are instead presented as a reason to reform the 
system from within since this is the best path for ac-
celerating and realising the protocol’s full potential.
A new dawn?
This continuing optimism is entirely misplaced. We 
now have twenty years of examples demonstrating 
that its design flaws and implementation failures are 
not blips or aberrations but are instead core features 
and functions. As the special rapporteur and other 
commentators lament, only a few hundred out of 
the purported 20 million people affected by traffick-
ing have received support from states. While global 
estimates of trafficking are notoriously unreliable, 
not least because of basic definitional problems, the 
difference between tens of millions (seven zeros) and 
hundreds (two zeros) should give even the most ar-
dent supporters pause. In theory, parties to the Paler-
mo protocol are committed to protecting and re-
specting the rights of trafficking victims (Article 2b). 
In practice, this is little more than rhetorical fantasy.
The primary role of the Palermo protocol has been 
to provide legitimacy to oppressive immigration 
and mobility controls; a whitewash for anti-immi-
gration programmes as the scholar Nandita Shar-
ma  observes. These include  border externalisation 
The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house: time to rethink the Palermo protocol
Sam Okyere
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measures by the European Union, United States and 
Australia,  which are today conveniently tagged in 
humanitarian terms as measures to prevent traffick-
ing. It has also helped justify questionable raids on 
brothels and other workplaces in the name of res-
cuing trafficking victims, and the creation of false 
boundaries between labour exploitation in the for-
mal and informal sectors. The protocol frames traf-
ficking as a subset of ‘illegal’ immigration or ‘infor-
mality’, and so anti-trafficking raids mainly target car 
wash bases, nail bars, brothels and other ‘informal’ 
spaces. The plight of migrant domestic workers, con-
struction workers, and others who move through 
state-sanctioned sponsorship visas and other per-
fectly legal channels to work legally in the formal 
economy is rarely the focus of anti-trafficking cam-
paigners’ advocacy. This is despite the evidence that 
many working under such formal or legal schemes 
are subjected to wholesale rights violations, includ-
ing confinement, passport confiscation, non-pay-
ment of wages, and physical violence or its threat.
‘Saviourism’ and crass racialised practices have also 
become its hallmark. Campaigners evoke the mem-
ories and imageries of the transatlantic slave trade 
for antitrafficking advocacy while conveniently ig-
noring the deleterious legacies of the transatlantic 
slave trade, colonisation, imperialism, and other 
historical injustices which underpin the misery of 
many of those black and brown people deemed 
most susceptible to precarious migration, exploit-
ative labour, and trafficking.
These problems are not accidental. References to 
rights and protections found in the Palermo pro-
tocol are little more than convenient fig leaves for 
the pursuit of anti-migration and anti-sex work 
interests which were the driving forces behind its 
creation. Punishment was always far more impor-
tant than protection. The governments who cham-
pioned the protocol are never going to break away 
from its focus on law enforcement and crime and 
instead embrace social justice and human rights 
protections. They have no incentive to take the leap, 
and this is not what they signed up for in the first 
place. They did not provide a tool that can be used 
to challenge them or to dismantle their house.
The perils of false consensus
The harmful consequences of clinging to the false 
hope of future reform is underscored by the find-
ings of my research with working children over 
the last decade. For children in their late teens the 
Palermo protocol is especially problematic. The 
construction of child trafficking effectively denies 
them their agency and capacity to make relatively 
informed choices about entry into work, taking up 
apprenticeships and other opportunities errone-
ously labelled by some as ‘child trafficking’. Further-
more, the definition of child trafficking per the pro-
tocol’s parameters is an exercise in legal abstraction 
which has little or no connection to many working 
children’s lived experiences. Core elements such as 
‘movement’, ‘harbouring’, ‘transfer’ ‘receipt’ and ‘ex-
ploitation’ are highly tenuous. What distance quali-
fies as ‘movement’, for example? A trip to the neigh-
bour’s house? A trip to the next village or town? 
One which involves crossing regional or national 
borders? Where do we draw the line?
“The Palermo protocol incentivises NGOs to cast islanders, parents, 
and fishermen as traffickers and enslavers of their children.”
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This lack of clarity coupled with the protocol’s dictate 
that anyone under the age of eighteen is incapable 
of consenting to their involvement in work means 
that what counts as ‘exploitation’ and ‘child traf-
ficking’ is  heavily reliant on the personal, cultural, 
political and other value judgements or interests of 
anti-trafficking NGOs and their staff. These are not 
objective assessments, but they can nonetheless have 
profound consequences. As discussed in a forth-
coming paper and in fieldwork planning activities 
for the European Research Council-funded project 
Modern Marronage, this has been disastrous for in-
digenous communities living on and around Lake 
Volta in Ghana. Over the past five years these island-
ers have been  repeatedly raided  by anti-trafficking 
NGOs and state security personnel under the pretext 
of rescuing children allegedly trafficked for fishing in 
the waters surrounding the islands.
Residents present harrowing stories of brutality 
and trauma from these raids, which have result-
ed in what they describe as the abduction of their 
children by anti-trafficking NGOs and the police. 
These NGOs have been able to leverage their con-
nections to the larger world to construct sensation-
al stories about ‘rescuing child slaves’ on the lake, 
and thereby construct the terms of engagement in 
ways which ensure that the underlying issues re-
main poorly understood.
Few questions have been raised about the appro-
priateness of the NGOs interventions. So too has 
there been hardly any scrutiny of the accuracy of 
their claims, which include assertions that there are 
several thousand child trafficking victims in these 
communities. Some NGO staff privately acknowl-
edge that the children working on the lake and 
elsewhere are not ‘child slaves’ or ‘child trafficking 
victims’, but rather child labourers or children driv-
en by precarious socio-economic circumstances 
into work. But this is not something which they can 
raise in public without risking their access, audi-
ence, and resources.
And yet, anti-trafficking modalities driven by the 
Palermo protocol do not encourage household- 
and community-based social welfare programmes, 
micro-credit schemes, provision of educational fa-
cilities, or other measures that may provide alter-
natives to fishing for children and their families. 
Instead, the criminal justice approach driven by the 
Palermo protocol and the Ghana Human Traffick-
ing Act modelled on it incentivises NGOs to cast 
the islanders, parents, and fishermen as traffickers 
and enslavers of their children. This framing pro-
vides justification for the raids and attracts funding 
for ‘rescue shelters’ and other facilities for children. 
The outcomes of all this are hardly all positive.
The Palermo protocol has been shockingly dismal 
as a human rights instrument for such children and 
their families. The same is true when it comes to 
sex workers subjected to mindless raids, migrants 
forced to undertake precarious journeys due to 
anti-trafficking related border controls, those os-
tensibly ‘rescued’ from traffickers but subsequently 
deported as immigration offenders, and many oth-
ers. To paraphrase Audre Lorde, it may allow some 
gains and temporary victories, but it will never al-
low an unequivocal human rights-based approach 
to migration and labour exploitation given its in-
terests in criminalising some forms of migration. 
On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, it is 
time to admit that the protocol is irredeemably 
flawed and has to be dismantled. In its place, we 
need to strengthen existing international instru-
ments focusing upon workers’ and migrants’ rights 
and protections. Better still, we need to develop a 
new instrument which completely avoids the trap 
of making of crime fighting a primary goal.
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Joel Quirk (BTS): The Palermo protocol was final-
ised over 20 years ago, and for many people work-
ing in the fields of trafficking and labour exploita-
tion today it has simply always been there. But that’s 
not actually the case. What was the field like before 
there was a Palermo protocol?
Marjan Wijers:  In the 1980s feminist groups with 
a background in development cooperation started 
working on trafficking in the Netherlands. They ac-
tually got into it because they were looking at sex 
tourism. Through that work and their contacts with 
Asian women’s organisations they came to realise 
there was a second flow of women the other way 
around, coming into the Netherlands and other Eu-
ropean countries to do sex work but also as domes-
tic workers and mail-order brides. That’s how the 
Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV) 
was founded in 1987.
We mainly worked with migrant women in the sex 
industry. Most of them were undocumented. Some 
originally planned to do a different sort of work, 
like domestic work or modelling, and ended up in 
the sex industry. Others came with the intention of 
doing sex work and ended up in abusive and forced 
working conditions. From the start, for us, it was 
not about innocent women forced into prostitution. 
It was about addressing exploitation and abuse of 
migrant women in the sex industry regardless of 
whether they had been forced into it or not. In fact 
several of our clients wanted to continue to do sex 
work, but now for themselves.
If memory serves, at that time only the Netherlands 
and Germany had groups working on the issue of 
migrant sex workers and trafficking. And, at that 
time, really nobody cared. We were talking about 
migrants. We were talking about foreign women, 
primarily from southeast Asia and Latin America, 
and women of colour. And we were talking about 
prostitutes. We didn’t yet use the term sex worker, 
that came later.
Our clients didn’t have rights, as women, as mi-
grants and as prostitutes. They had fewer rights and 
opportunities than men at home. And they didn’t 
have rights here in Western Europe because most of 
them were undocumented and, above all, they had 
no rights because they were whores. I explicitly use 
the word ‘whores’ as it really didn’t matter wheth-
er they made their own decision to do sex work or 
whether they had been forced into it. ‘Once a whore 
always a whore, who do you think will care?’ – that’s 
what their exploiters told them.
And that is precisely what happened. Even if they 
went to the police, cases weren’t taken seriously. 
They were just deported right back to the situation 
they had tried to escape from, and the cases weren’t 
prosecuted. The first actions we undertook together 
with women who would now qualify as ‘victims of 
trafficking’ pushed for things like temporary resi-
dence permits, the ability to press charges, and for 
cases to be actively investigated and prosecuted. I 
think it was more or less the same in Germany.
Interest in trafficking rose quickly with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. There were a number 
of reasons for that. I do not want to be cynical, 
but I am convinced that one was that the victims 
changed from women of colour to white women, 
Eastern European women. So from ‘them’ to ‘us’. 
The other, I think, was that we didn’t know how fast 
we could rebuild the wall. Once the wall fell every-
body could travel freely again. That was nice, but, of 
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course, never the intention. And then there was the 
fear that we would be flooded not only by Eastern 
European migrants but also by the Russian mafia. 
Trafficking provided the perfect justification for 
an anti-migration agenda in the name of combat-
ing trafficking, literally under the banner of ‘if they 
can’t come, they cannot become victims either’. A 
lot of trafficking money was spent on rebuilding the 
Polish borders, for instance.
These factors helped push trafficking on the polit-
ical agenda. It wasn’t so much that people became 
more concerned about the rights of sex workers 
or migrants, or about protecting sex workers from 
abuse. It was mostly that the argument of trafficking 
perfectly served a number of state interests, which 
became urgent after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
At the same time, there was the second feminist 
movement. That brought attention to sexual violence 
and the right of women to decide over their own 
bodies. And since the 1970s sex workers had started 
to organise – that was also a movement that came up. 
So on the one hand we had the sex workers’ rights 
movement claiming the right to choose the work you 
want to do and not be punished or criminalised for 
it, and on the other hand the anti-trafficking move-
ment claiming the right to not be forced to do work 
you do not want to do. Both claims are about human 
rights, the freedom to choose your own profession 
and the right to be protected from forced labour, and 
both should be respected. That’s how we looked at it 
– in our view pro-rights and anti-violence were two 
sides of the same coin. So from our start we worked 
together with the Red Thread, the Dutch prostitutes 
rights organisation.
Preceding all of this was the question of what to 
call these sorts of abuses. Let me say it like this: if 
we had known the history and the inherent flaws 
of the concept of trafficking back then, we never 
would have used it. What we should have done was 
talk about forced labour, including forced sexual 
services, slavery-like practices and servitude. We 
should have used concepts that describe the liv-
ing and working conditions in which people find 
themselves. These are concepts that are defined in 
international human rights law, and they’re kind of 
neutral. But at that time we weren’t aware of all that, 
so we ended up falling back on the 19th-century 
Victorian concept of trafficking with its focus on 
the purity and victimhood of women and the pro-
tection of national borders. In doing so, we unwit-
tingly imported a highly biased concept, dividing 
women into innocent victims in need of rescue and 
guilty ones who can be abused with impunity, but 
also with racist and nationalistic overtones.
Despite efforts to counter these flaws, this inheritance 
continues to define the debate on trafficking today, 
as exemplified by the distinction the UN Trafficking 
Protocol makes between so-called ‘sexual exploitation’ 
and ‘labour exploitation’ and its focus on recruitment 
and movement rather than working conditions. His-
torically, trafficking has been used to control women’s 
sexuality and mobility and to justify oppressive meas-
ures against sex workers and migrants, rather than 
protecting their human rights. Already in the 1990s it 
had become clear that this was what was happening. 
So when we started the negotiations on the trafficking 
protocol, we were very much aware of the problems of 
the concept. And we tried to address them.
“If we had known the history and the inherent flaws of the concept 
of trafficking back then, we never would have used it.”
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Joel: Did you enter into those negotiations believ-
ing that they were an opportunity, or did you main-
ly approach them with trepidation and anxiety? 
Was it already clear what the fault lines would be, 
or did those surprise you?
Marjan: There had already been a lot of discussion 
around the definition of trafficking by the time it 
reached the top of the international agenda. Is 
trafficking only about women and children? Does 
trafficking only takes place across borders or also 
happen within borders? Is trafficking only about 
forcing women into prostitution or is it also about 
abusive recruitment practices for domestic work 
and other kinds of labour? Is it only about recruit-
ment or also about abusive and slavery-like work-
ing conditions? Pretty much all the questions and 
issues that played a role in the negotiations on the 
trafficking protocol were already points of conten-
tion in the larger political debate.
So there was a tremendous amount of confusion 
about what the concept was. And even if people 
agreed that the core of trafficking was coercion or 
force, there wasn’t consensus about what ‘force’ re-
ferred to, especially in relation to sex work. Did it 
refer to both abusive conditions of recruitment and 
work? Or did it refer solely to the way a woman came 
to be a prostitute, as a result of her own decision or 
forced by others (thus excluding women who con-
sciously decided to work in the sex industry but who 
were subject to force and abuse in the course of their 
work)? And then some viewed prostitution itself as 
a violation of human rights akin to slavery. In this 
view no woman is able to voluntarily consent to sex 
work and any distinction made on the basis of con-
sent or the will of the woman is meaningless.
We knew all these discussions were taking place, so 
we knew the dangers and we knew how much the 
concept was mixed up with the anti-prostitution 
and anti-migration agendas. We also knew it was 
sexist in the way that it linked the right of women 
to be protected against violence with their sexual 
innocence or purity. So we knew exactly what was 
wrong. Not everybody did perhaps, but the Glob-
al Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) 
– which was founded by Thai women groups and 
STV over the course of the 1990s – certainly did. A 
number of human rights organisations did, and sex 
worker organisations of course were very conscious 
of it from the very beginning.
Joel: Could the Palermo protocol have turned out 
differently? Or did it seem more or less fixed from 
the beginning, and what you got was roughly what 
you expected?
Marjan: We were not that optimistic. We knew what 
the problems were, and we knew how the concept 
was used against sex workers and immigrants. So 
we were well prepared in that sense. We had a num-
ber of aims and we organised across movements. 
We brought anti-trafficking, human rights and sex 
workers’ rights organisations and activists together, 
led by the International Human Rights Law Group 
and GAATW. I took part on behalf of GAATW and 
the Dutch Foundation Against Trafficking in Wom-
en where I worked at the time.
The composition of this alliance was really impor-
tant in that it was the first time that these three 
movements worked together in a joint lobby. Espe-
cially the combination of anti-trafficking and pro-
sex workers’ rights groups and activists was radical, 
as it bridged the historical gap between the two 
movements caused by the persistent conflation of 
trafficking and sex work.
For the sex workers’ movement it was really a dif-
ficult position because they were clearly against the 
whole concept of trafficking. They had already suf-
fered a lot from it. At the same time, we all knew that 
it was important to try to do as much damage con-
trol as possible. So the negotiations on the protocol 
were not like, ‘Oh, this is a beautiful chance.’ They 
were like, we already know the damage and we know 
that it can become even worse, so what can we do 
to control the damage and try to make the best of 
it? We prepared our documents together, went to the 
negotiations together, and lobbied together.
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Like the states, NGOs were deeply divided on how 
trafficking should be defined – that is, what prac-
tices should be combated. While we made a clear 
distinction between trafficking and sex work and 
held that conditions of forced labour in all indus-
tries should be addressed, the other NGO block, 
led by the US-based Coalition Against Trafficking 
in Women (CATW), regarded all sex work as traf-
ficking and wanted the protocol to combat prosti-
tution as such.
By the time of the negotiations on the protocol, 
CATW had been around for a while and they had 
gained a lot of influence. I attended one of their con-
ferences in New York at the end of the 1980s. At that 
point they hadn’t a clue about trafficking or the posi-
tion and experiences of migrant women. They were 
mainly focused on violence against white women 
and pornography. I remember Andrea Dworkin, like 
a priestess sweeping a whole hall of women into hys-
terics about a woman being forced by her employer 
to look at Deep Throat, a famous porno film at that 
time. But during the 1990s they got a lot of money 
from conservative governments and became a rich, 
important, influential anti-prostitution lobby with 
chapters in a number of Asian countries.
If I remember correctly, they were not there for the 
first session of negotiations on the protocol, but from 
the second session onwards they were there. And 
from that time on, there were two opposed NGO-lob-
bying blocks. Our block, operating under the name of 
Human Rights Caucus, advocated a broad and com-
prehensive definition of trafficking with coercion as 
the core element. We wanted to include men as well as 
women and children, to go beyond prostitution and 
include all sectors of work in which people could end 
up under slavery and forced labour-like conditions, 
and to include both cross-border and internal traffick-
ing. We wanted to go broad as we thought this might 
neutralise the problematic parts of the traditional 
concept of trafficking.
The other block, which next to CATW included 
among others the European Women’s Lobby and 
the French International Abolitionist Federation, 
wanted a protocol that defined all prostitution as 
trafficking, and that only applied to women and 
children. Significantly, they operated under the 
name of International Human Rights Network, 
kind of copying our name and adding to the con-
fusion about who was who. Those were the two op-
posing positions, and the final definition is a clear 
compromise between those two positions. On the 
one hand it makes a clear distinction between sex 
work and trafficking. It covers women, men, and 
children, and includes all labour sectors rather than 
just the sex industry. On the other hand, “exploita-
tion of prostitution and sexual exploitation” is sin-
gled out as separate and different from what came 
to be called ‘labour exploitation’ – that is forced la-
bour, slavery-like practices and servitude in other 
industries. And we’ve seen the harmful effects of it.
Joel: What you’ve said so far reflects the commonly 
told story about the Palermo negotiations, which 
is essentially an argument between two opposing 
coalitions of NGOs and civil society voices. And I 
understand that that was a key flash point. But it 
has always struck me that this portrayal misses out 
on the role of states. Governments always have the 
final say in these kinds of negotiations – civil soci-
ety doesn’t get to write its own international law. 
Could you say more about the governmental posi-
tions during the negotiations?
Marjan: The fight between NGOs was more or less 
also reflected in the position of governments. It was 
a long time ago, but from what I remember, I think 
there were three issues that divided the states – and 
not always along the same lines. One was the moral 
issue of prostitution and the idea that all prostitu-
tion is trafficking. States started out with different 
positions on prostitution, but I think they found it 
relatively easy to say, ‘Even if we do not agree about 
prostitution, we do agree about coercion, so let›s 
limit this treaty to situations of abuse and coercion 
and not prostitution as such.’ That more or less 
solved the moral question, though the moral issue 
comes back in other articles, for example the one 
on addressing demand.
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Then I think there was a difference regarding bor-
ders. Rich and poor countries were more opposed 
when it came to migration. For the rich countries, 
especially, it was really important to include articles 
in the protocol about protecting borders, while for 
the poor countries the remittances labour migrants 
sent home formed an important part of their na-
tional income. The third point was rights of vic-
tims. Sending countries were much more inclined 
to include victim protection provisions, while re-
ceiving countries were not inclined to do that at all.
That’s also reflected in the protocol. There are a 
number of provisions on protections for victims, 
but they are not obligatory. Victim protection is up 
to the discretion of the states, whereas all the law 
enforcement provisions are mandatory. And there, 
I think, the NGO lobby really failed. Our faction 
felt that even if we didn’t agree with the others on 
prostitution, we should be able to agree on the need 
for victim protection provisions. But the other side 
didn’t want to cooperate.
Joel: Why not?
Marjan: Because they didn›t want to work with us, 
in part because of how polarised we all were and in 
part because – and this is probably nasty to say – it 
wasn›t in their interest. We were the ones working 
with victims. We were the ones who wanted victim 
protections. They had a totally different, ideologi-
cally driven, agenda. They wanted to combat pros-
titution. And what the actual impact of that was on 
women, on sex workers, on victims – I don’t think 
they really cared.
Joel: The Palermo protocol is what gives us the in-
ternationally agreed definition of trafficking. At the 
heart of it is this idea that human trafficking is for 
the purpose of exploitation – that is the hinge of 
the whole treaty. Yet exploitation is not defined – 
there’s just a non-exhaustive list of examples. Why 
doesn’t the protocol at any point actually say what 
exploitation is?
Marjan: They couldn›t agree upon it.
Joel: They couldn’t agree on it because people wanted 
very different versions, or couldn’t agree on it because 
exploitation is just really hard to define?
Marjan: What I remember is that there were a num-
ber of states and international experts, like the UN 
High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, the Inter-
national Labour Organisation, and ourselves who 
said don›t use the word exploitation. Stick to forced 
labour, servitude, slavery-like practices, etc., which 
are accepted and defined concepts in international 
human rights law. They also advocated to delete the 
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word ‘sexual exploitation’ because it is undefined, 
controversial, and unnecessary. The Special Rap-
porteur on Violence Against Women, for example, 
noted that the term ‘sexual exploitation’ could be 
interpreted in very different ways, depending on 
whether you believed that prostitution constituted 
‘sexual exploitation’ per se, or whether it referred to 
situations of forced labour, servitude or slavery-like 
practices, which could happen in the sex industry 
but also in domestic labour or servile marriages.
And then there was the other group of states, which 
included the US, who wanted to have exploitation 
of prostitution and sexual exploitation in the pro-
tocol independent of the use of deception, force 
or coercion. They really wanted to have that in the 
protocol. I remember us writing a letter to Ma-
deleine Albright, the US secretary of state at that 
time, to try to discuss the US position with her. It 
was signed by a whole bunch of experts from dif-
ferent organisations in the US and elsewhere, and 
it argued that there was consensus on limiting the 
protocol to forced situations and warned that ex-
panding it to include voluntary prostitution would 
mean that several countries would refuse to sign it.
The compromise was to put both of them in. The 
phrase ‘for the purpose of exploitation’ was kind 
of the general term, and then under that heading 
you could put both exploitation of prostitution 
and forced labour, etc. The terms ‘exploitation of 
the prostitution of others’ and ‘sexual exploitation’ 
were intentionally left undefined, so states could 
decide for themselves how they wanted to address 
prostitution in their domestic laws. It was a typical 
political compromise where both parties more or 
less got what they wanted.
Joel: You mentioned the harmful effects of singling 
out sexual exploitation as different from forced la-
bour, slavery-like practices and servitude. What do 
you mean by that?
Marjan: The inclusion of exploitation of prostitu-
tion as a separate purpose from forced labour, etc. 
reinforced the historical obsession with prostitu-
tion and fed into the old conflation of trafficking 
and sex work and the preoccupation with the puri-
ty of women. It not only implies that sex work can-
not be labour, but it also falsely suggests that forced 
labour cannot exist in the sex industry, consequent-
ly depriving sex workers of protection against the 
practice. The ILO had always considered forced 
prostitution as a form of forced labour, so separat-
ing it really is a step backwards.
Forced labour and slavery-like practices are not de-
fined by the type of the work but by the forced and 
unfree working conditions. According to the defini-
tion in the protocol this should also apply to traffick-
ing. Nobody would ever argue that a domestic worker 
cannot be a victim of trafficking simply because she 
knew she would do domestic work or had worked as 
a domestic worker before. But when it comes to sex 
work you see that in practice many states restrict force 
to refer only to forcing somebody into prostitution 
and not to forced working conditions.
The effect is that in many cases, instead of the of-
fender standing trial, it is the victim who has to 
prove her ‘innocence’, thus shifting the focus from 
the acts of the trafficker to the morality of the vic-
tim. This distinction between ‘good’ women who 
deserve protection and ‘bad’ women who forfeit-
ed their right to protection against abuse is one of 
the major obstacles to combating trafficking. It not 
only implies that sex workers can be abused with 
impunity, but also that the right of women to be 
protected against violence and abuse is determined 
by their sexual purity or ‘honour’. This is not only 
harmful for sex workers, but for all women.
This sex work exceptionalism also paved the way to 
completely opposite strategies. Where everybody 
agrees that it’s important to strengthen rights and 
support unionisation, organisation, etc. in order to 
combat forced labour or abusive labour conditions, 
the exact opposite strategies are promoted when it 
comes to combating trafficking in the sex industry. 
There further criminalisation is advocated, which 
adds to the stigma and leaves sex workers with less 
instead of more rights. This is reinforced by the arti-
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cle in the protocol that calls on states to “discourage 
the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation”. 
This of course is interpreted as solely applying to 
sex work and laid the foundation for the so-called 
‘end demand’ campaigns that call for the criminali-
sation of clients of sex workers.
The separation of sexual exploitation from the oth-
er purposes also made it crucial to include the co-
ercive means in the protocol. Without that it would 
have become a treaty against prostitution, because 
it would have simply been recruitment, transport, 
etc., for the purpose of exploitation of prostitution, 
independent of the use of force or coercion. If the 
purpose would have only been forced labour, slav-
ery, etc., you wouldn’t have needed the coercive or 
deceptive means as these are inherently coercive. 
What we’ve seen in practice is that a number of 
countries, like Mexico, have deleted the means. 
And if you delete the means you turn the anti-traf-
ficking protocol into an anti-prostitution protocol.
A fourth problem is the focus on movement. It 
takes away attention from the forced labour and 
slavery-like outcomes which constitute the actual 
human rights violations. This not only provides 
states with a justification to pursue a border control 
agenda under the guise of combating trafficking, 
but it also creates two categories of victims: those 
who arrive in a forced labour or slavery-like situ-
ation through trafficking and those who get there 
though other ways. The first group is entitled to 
support, even if it is pretty minimal, while the sec-
ond is excluded from any rights because they did 
not get there through trafficking. From a human 
rights point of view that is of course unacceptable. 
In fact, it mirrors the first treaties on trafficking 
around 1900 which addressed the cross-border 
recruitment of women for what was then called 
immoral purposes, but explicitly left aside coercive 
conditions inside the brothels. That was considered 
to be a question of internal legislation.
Joel: Did you come out of the negotiations feeling 
happy or feeling worried?
Marjan: I think a bit of both. We were happy that 
it covered all people rather than just women and 
children. We were happy that it covered all sectors. 
We were happy that, at least in the definition and 
explanation of the protocol, it was clear that co-
ercion was a core element of trafficking. That had 
been a big fight. So we were happy that it was clear 
that coercion, deceit, or force must be present for 
something to be trafficking.
At the same time, we were very concerned about 
the distinction that was made between exploitation 
of prostitution and the other purposes of forced 
labour, etc. And our concerns have proven to be 
completely justified. We were also extremely disap-
pointed about the lack of human rights protections 
for trafficked persons. People tend to think the pro-
tocol is a human rights treaty, but very obviously it 
is not. It is part of a treaty on organised crime, it is 
a law enforcement instrument.
Joel: It seems people have done a lot of work to ex-
pand the definition of trafficking when it comes to 
sex work, but they’ve been reluctant to think more 
“People tend to think the protocol is a human rights treaty, but very 
obviously it is not.”
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broadly in other areas. They’ve baulked at applying 
it to migrant workers, or workers in global sup-
ply chains, for example. Do you agree with that? 
Do people try and apply trafficking broadly when 
it comes to sex work, and then narrowly when it 
comes to migrant workers because it’s otherwise 
just too politically inconvenient?
Marjan:  Well, exploitation and the availability of 
cheap and exploitable labour is in fact the core of 
the capitalist system. If we would really want to 
address exploitation in other industries, it would 
touch our own interests in cheap services and prod-
ucts. We would have to pay more for our mobile 
phones, for our vegetables, for having our houses 
and offices cleaned, etc. It is therefore much more 
attractive to focus on sex work, which fits a moral 
rather than an economic agenda and is easy to sep-
arate from our daily lives and interests.
Addressing exploitation would require a social jus-
tice agenda. It would require improving the eco-
nomic, social and legal position of migrants for 
example. Focusing on prostitution, on the contrary, 
makes it possible to reduce the issue to a crime and 
punishment framework. It stops short of trying to 
address the economic system. And, of course, res-
cuing innocent maidens is much more sexy. All this 
once again exposes how flawed the whole concept 
is. We spend millions to combat trafficking while 
the forced labour treaties, which already stem from 
the 1930s and 1950s, have never gotten such atten-
tion. That hasn’t happened by accident.
Joel: Would you say the problem lies more in the proto-
col or what governments do with the protocol?
Marjan: You can›t separate them. The protocol was 
a political compromise between two opposing views 
and interests. There was a reason for making that 
compromise, and those reasons are also reflected in 
the way it is applied. So I don›t think you can really 
make that distinction. A lot of states are dependent 
on migrant labour, and it would be against their in-
terests to address abusive conditions of migrant and 
other low paid workers. So they›re not very prone to 
do that. Besides, it’s much easier to focus on prosti-
tution, borders, and the morality of women. That is 
a much better fit with state interests than addressing 
the abusive labour conditions experienced by mi-
grant and other low-paid groups of workers keeping 
your economy going. So why should you?
Joel: Have you become more optimistic or pessi-
mistic in the time that’s passed regarding the value 
of human trafficking as a way of addressing ques-
tions of exploitation?
Marjan:  I think what we feared has happened. It 
has done very little to address actual human rights 
violations or the causes of the exploitation of peo-
ple under forced labour or slavery-like conditions. 
Nor did it do much for victim rights because, of 
course, abuses do exist. Nobody denies that there 
are serious human rights abuses of people, but the 
protocol does little to address them. On the contra-
ry, it backs measures that make the abuses worse. 
Repressive measures always have a negative impact 
on the most vulnerable groups. The more you crim-
inalise or stigmatise groups, the more vulnerable 
you make them for abuse and the more you close 
off their access to justice.
I would say the situation has worsened for quite a 
lot of groups. That’s certainly true for sex workers, 
but also for many migrants. The Palermo protocol 
provided states with an instrument to justify re-
pressive measures that put people in more vulner-
able positions. And at the same time, it didn’t do 
much to improve the situation for victims of abuse. 
In most states you have to cooperate with the pros-
ecution in order to benefit as a victim, which means 
that you have to put yourself and your family at 
more risk. And if you’re a migrant you’ll likely be 
deported once you’re no longer useful as a witness. 
We also know that criminal law is not made for vic-
tims. Criminal law is an issue between states and 
perpetrators. Victims are basically nothing more 
than a fingerprint, something you put in a drawer 
and take out if you need evidence. That’s it. It’s pos-
sible that the Palermo protocol did a little bit for a 
small category of victims, but it didn’t make things 
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better for the majority of them, and it did harm to 
much bigger groups.
During the negotiations we advocated that traffick-
ing should cover both abusive conditions of recruit-
ment and abusive conditions of work. The protocol 
does not do this. Trafficking under the protocol is 
limited to the recruitment process, the way people 
arrive in exploitative situations. This means that 
we have millions of people in conditions of forced 
labour all over the world who didn’t arrive there 
through trafficking, and because they didn’t get there 
through trafficking they are completely rightless. It’s 
like combatting the slave trade but not slavery. If you 
were born a slave because your parents were slaves 
that’s fine, just as long as you didn’t get there through 
the slave trade. We tried to convey the need to com-
bat the exploitation itself, but that didn’t happen.
Joel: So where do we go from here? Some people 
suggest that there should be a follow-up convention 
that would affirm and extend the Palermo protocol. 
Others argue that trafficking has created so many 
problems that it’s best to just scrap it and try some-
thing else. What’s your view? Is it worth staying in 
the anti-trafficking tent and seeking to reform from 
within? Or is it better to pick a different battlefield 
and fight using a different set of concepts?
Marjan: We tried those strategies. We tried to get 
rid of the whole concept of trafficking and we wer-
en’t successful. Once you’ve opened up Pandora’s 
box, you know, it’s out of your control. It›s there to 
stay. There are too many other interests attached to 
the concept of trafficking to get rid of it. And those 
aren’t the interests of the people who are affected.
We also tried damage control. I still flatter myself 
with the idea that at least we did some damage con-
trol in the negotiations. It could have been worse, 
but that doesn’t make it good. And I must say that 
after 30 years of damage control alone, I’m tired, 
and it’s not only me. Doing damage control is not 
the most inspiring thing to do in life.
My conclusion is that it is much better to work on 
rights. I see two ways forward. One is to work on 
sex workers’ rights, migrants’ rights, etc. It’s difficult 
and we live in repressive times. We are in a conserv-
ative, repressive period of history. It’s not only sex 
work – it’s sexual and reproductive rights in gen-
eral. It’s not only migrant workers – it’s migrants, 
refugees, etc. All human rights are under pressure. 
But at least they used to be seen as something to 
strive for. Now the necessity of human rights as a 
whole is up for debate.
Joel: I talk to lots of different campaigners, and I 
know people who work on reparations for transat-
lantic enslavement, and they never get invited into 
the halls of power. They’re on the outside making 
claims that governments don’t like. And I contrast 
that with people who work on anti-trafficking, who 
get invited to cabinets and boardrooms, who are 
given a platform, who have influence and access to 
centres of power. I’ve been wondering for a while 
now how addictive that access is. Changing the 
conversation means giving up that access, includ-
ing access to funding, and that makes it hard to say, 
‘This anti-trafficking stuff isn’t working. I need to 
go work on sex worker rights, migrant rights, un-
ionising workers, and all these types of things.’ How 
easy do you think it really is for people who work 
on anti-trafficking to start working on other things, 
given that the political profile of those other things 
is just far less hospitable to activism?
Marjan:  It’s absolutely true. And also within the 
anti-trafficking movement there is a big divide. 
There›s the progressive part to which I belong, 
which is rights-based, and to which the Global Alli-
ance Against Traffic in Women belongs. And there 
is the conservative anti-trafficking movement, 
which is all too happy to sleep in one bed with the 
state and with power.
If you want to get money, do trafficking. Don’t 
choose migrants’ rights or sex workers’ rights. 
That’s a stupid choice if you want money and in-
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fluence. And of course money is addictive. When 
we started at the end of the 1980s nobody was in-
terested. Once it became a big issue, I don’t know 
how many hundreds of organisations jumped on 
the bandwagon.
I think that in the end, no matter how difficult it is 
to focus on rights rather than repression, it is the 
best thing we can do. I’m happy that the Interna-
tional Labour Organization has now picked up the 
issue. I think that if we want to address abuses, or 
if we want to address the exploitation of people in 
forced labour and slavery-like conditions, the ILO 
is a better way to go.
I would continue to try to work together with the 
ILO. I would put pressure on them to also include 
the sex industry. It took years before they included 
domestic workers, but they did in the end. And it’s 
not that the world changes when an internation-
al treaty is concluded. Certainly not for domestic 
workers, but it is a step. It’s a small step, but at least a 
step in the direction of rights instead of repression. 
So I think it would be important for the ILO to also 
include the sex industry as an area of concern over 
labour standards.
If you can pull the ILO, it also means that you shift 
to much more neutral concepts. We should be 
aware of how tainted and flawed concepts can be, 
and how far reaching the influence of a concept is. 
Like I said in the beginning, if we had been aware 
of the history of trafficking and of what it meant 
to import that concept, we would not have done it. 
You really have to be very much aware of the lan-
guage you use, the concepts you import, and try to 
look for neutral language.
Trafficking is not going away, and we won’t escape 
the need for damage control. We have to continue 
to do that. But at the same time, as a movement, it’s 
really important to connect to other rights-based 
movements. The migrants’ rights movement, the 
sex workers’ rights movement, and the human 
rights movement need to come together and devel-
op their own, rights-based agenda.
This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.
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